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FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT OF 1933- THE INTRASTATE
EXEMPTION OF SECTION 3(a)(1 1)--FACT OR FICTION?
By SANFORD B. HERTZ
Sanford B. Hertz received his B.A.
degree from Pennsylvania State
University in 1952 and his J.D. de-
gree from the University of Michi-
gan Law School in 1955. At law
school he was Senior Editor of the
Michigan Law Review and was
elected to The Order of the Coif.
From 1955 until mid-1957 he was
an attorney with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. He is a
member of the Colorado, Denver,
Federal, Michigan and American
Bar Associations and presently is
chairman of the Denver Bar As-
sociation Junior Bar Committee. Mr.
Hertz is presently in private practice
in Denver.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a general matter, section 5 of the Federal Securities Act of
1933, as currently amended, prohibits the offer of any security
through the use of the mails or other means or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce unless and until a registration statement has
been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and pro-
hibits a sale of securities by federal jurisdictional means unless and
until a registration statement is effective with the Commission.'
Congress, however, recognized that with respect to certain securities
and certain transactions involving securities, registration would be
unnecessary in the public interest, and therefore provided a series
of exemptions set forth in sections 3 and 4 of the Securities Act of
1933.2 The purpose of this article is to discuss one of these exemp-
tions, the intrastate exemption of section 3 (a) (11) of the 1933 Act,"
with a view to pointing up some of the problems which arise and
how these problems might be solved.4
148 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1956). Prior to the 1954 amendments to the Securities
Act of 1933, it was unlawful to both offer and sell securities by interstate means or by the use
of the mails unless a registration statement was effective with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. It should be noted, however, that even before the 1954 amendments, the Commission recog-
nized the necessity for dissemination of informat'on about a security, distinguishing it from solicita-tion. Thus, the use of the "red herring prospectus" was encouraged, the Commission expressly
holding that such use was not to be construed as an offer to sell securities prior to effective date.
Former Rule 131 of General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933. In 1954 thistheory was codified by permitting offers but not sales, contracts of sale or contracts to sell prior
to the effective date. See Loss, Securities Regulation 149 (1951), and Loss, Securities Regulation 51,
67 (195 Supplement). See, also, S. Rep. No. 1036 at 15 and H. R. Rep. No. 1542 at 23. 83d Cong.,2d Seis: (T954), and SEC, Securities Act af 1933 Release No. 3519 (1954)., 17 C.F.R. 230.433 con-tains the requirements for the preliminary prospectus to be used prior to effective date. This is
the successor to the "red herring prospectus."
248 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77c & d (1956).
s48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 
7
7c(a)(11) (1956).
4 For articles discussing other exemptions from the registration requirements, see, Hertz, The
Federal Securities Act of 1933: Revised Regulation A, 33 DICTA 307 (1956); Mehler, The Securities
Act of 1933; "Private or Public " Offering, 32 DICTA 359 (1955);.70 Harv. L. Rev. 1438 (1957).
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The intrastate exemption found in section 3 (a) (11) of the 1933
Act states:
"Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the pro-
visions of this title shall not apply to any of the following
classes of securities:
"Any security which is'a part of an issue offered and
sold only to persons resident within a single State or Terri-
tory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident
and doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated
by and doing business within, such State or Territory."'
It has generally been held that this exemption was designed to
apply only to "local financing by local industries, carried out purely
through local purchasing."6 Thus, the initial intent in the enactment
of this exemption is rather simple, recognizing the needs of purely
local industry and in effect finding that registration would be un-
necessary for the protection of investors and in the public interest.
It should be noted, however, that the exemption applies only to the
registration requirements of the 1933 act and not to the anti-fraud
provisions of section 17. 7
Despite the simple purpose of this section, it causes some serious
language interpretation problems and creates others when we at-
tempt to ascertain whether the exemption is available in any par-
ticular situation. Our efforts will be devoted to these problems. A
brief resume of what we will subsequently discuss will prove help-
ful at this point. Extensive treatment will be devoted to the meaning
of the phrase "resident within a single State or Territory. . ." as used
in section 3 (a) (11). The problem is particularly at issue in attempt-
ing to ascertain whether the above-quoted phrase is synonymous
with the term "domiciled" and if so, what is the legal definition of
this latter term. Particular attention has also been devoted to the
problem of whether military personnel assigned to a particular state
are "resident in" or "domiciled within" that state. Would a sale of
securities to such a person be deemed a sale to a "non-resident"?
Another troublesome interpretive problem which will be treat-
ed, but less extensively, is the "issue" concept created by the use of
the language "a part of an issue . . . ." in section 3(a) (11). Some
standard will be suggested to determine when an offering of securi-
ties is part of an issue in order to ascertain when two separate offer-
ings should be deemed integrated in arriving at a conclusion con-
cerning the availability of this exemption.
Brief consideration will also be given in discussing the 1954
amendment to section 3(a) (11) which added the words "offered
and" before the term "sold." The question arises specifically when
an offer is made to a non-resident through the use of the mails or
means of interstate commerce but no sale is consummated. Query,
whether the availability of the exemption in such a situation would
be destroyed. Further, a brief discussion will be made on the require-
ment that the issuer be "doing business within" the state where the
offers and sales are to be made.
548 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77c(a)(11) (1956).
'SEC, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 1459 (1937). See, also, Loss, Securities Regulation 374
(1951), and 379 (Supp. 1955).
'48 Stot. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 
77
q (1956). Loss, Securities Regulation 413 (1951).
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Apart from the aforementioned problems which arise because
of the language used in section 3 (a) (11), consideration will be given
to other general questions. Among these will be the problem of an
immediate resale by a resident investor to a non-resident investor,
raising the question of trading v. distributing. If the contract to
purchase and sell the securities is to be on the installment payment
basis, what result if the purchaser moves from the jurisdiction prior
to the time all payments have been completed? If securities are sold
in joint names, need both co-owners be residents? What result if the
resident co-owner pays the entire consideration for the securities?
II. PROBLEMS OF LANGUAGE INTERPRETATION
The position has generally been taken that an offer alone,
without the consummation of a sale, of securities to non-residents
will vitiate the exemption.8 This was so even prior to the 1954
amendment to the Securities Act of 1933 which added the words "of-
fered and" before the term "sold." The necessity for this change was
brought about because of the amendment to section 5 permitting
offers, but not sales, prior to effective date. Since section 2 (3) of the
1933 act defined a "sale" to include an "offer," it became mandatory
to change this definition to conform to amended section 5.9 This was
done by removing an "offer" from the integral part of a "sale" and
by redefining an "offer" separate from a "sale," to include every at-
8 Loss, Securities Regulation 375 (1951). SEC, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 1459 (1937).












tempt to dispose of a security for value. Once this had been accom-
plished, it was necessary to add the words "offered and" in section
3 (a) (11) to demonstrate the intent to limit both offers and sales of
securities to residents of a single state or territory. Thus, as a prac-
tical matter, the 1954 amendment to section 3 (a) (11) did not change
the law as it existed prior to the amendment, and an offer alone to
a non-resident without a sale will vitiate the exemption.
The language "a part of an issue" used in section 3 (a) (11) has
caused some concern and deserves special consideration. As a gen-
eral matter it might be said at the outset that the entire "issue"
must be sold to residents of only one state in order to insure that the
exemption will be available. 10 The real dilemma comes when an
attempt is made to define and ascertain just what is an "issue" of
securities. Such a determination presupposes consideration of the
question whether one offering of securities should be integrated
with another offering. The most lucid way of examining this prob-
lem is by means of a variable hypothetical case:
Assume that on February 1, 1957 the board of directors
of XYZ Mining Company met to discuss the need for addi-
tional capital to expand their exploration and development
program. Tie Board authorized the public sale of 1,000,000
shares of $1.00 par value stock at the market price, to be
offered in two separate blocks at two separate times (six
months separating each offering), the first block pursuant
to Regulation A 1l in ten states, and the second block only to
residents of the State of Colorado. All the proceeds from the
first block sold are to be used in exploration; the proceeds
from the second block to be used in advance exploration and
in development, if warranted, on the same property. If the
first block were entirely sold under Regulation A to resi-
dents of more than one state, could the second offering be
made under the intrastate exemption? (Assume, for the
sake of discussion, that all other factors of the intrastate ex-
emption would be available if the "issue" question were re-
solved favorably for the company.)
The above hypothetical case directly raises the issue of whether
two offerings will or should be integrated, i.e., the Regulation A
and the purported intrastate offering of section 3 (a) (11). It is there-
fore essential to determine what elements should be examined in
order to ascertain whether one offering is to be integrated with
another. The following factors, among perhaps many others, seem
relevant in determining the question of integration:
(1) The offerings are made at or about the same time.
(2) The offerings are part of a single plan of financing.
(3) The offerings involve issuance of the same class of security.
(4) The same type of consideration is to be received.
(5) The offerings are made for the same general purpose.
Certainly, if all these factors exist, the tendency would be to
integrate the offerings into one single issue. If, however, one or
O SEC, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 1459 (1937).
uI 17 C.F.R. 230.251-62 (1956).
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more factors are missing, all the circumstances must be considered
and the relative value of the various factors weighed to determine
the integration question.
Thus, if in our hypothetical case the offerings were part of a
single plan of financing, involved the same securities for the same
consideration, were made for the same general purpose, and were
made at or about the same time, it probably would be found that the
offering of the second block of stock would be part of the same
"issue" as the first, and thus integrated. Since the offering under
Regulation A was multi-state, the section 3 (a) (11) exemption would
probably not be available for the second offering. It can be conclud-
ed, as a general matter, that because of the "issue" concept in section
3(a) (11), this exemption is incapable of combination with any
other exemption under the 1933 act.12
However, varying the facts in our above hypothetical case in
order to show that the securities were not identical, e.g., the first
block may be equity securities while the second block, debt securi-
ties; that the two blocks of securities were issued for different con-
siderations, e.g., the first block to the public under Regulation A for
cash, and the second block to the public for property or equipment;
that the second offering was made two years after the first and not
six months after; that the purposes of each offering were entirely
different and authorized at different times; then we might conclude
that the offerings were not integrated and therefore the second
block might be offered and sold under the section 3 (a) (11) exemp-
tion.
The conclusion, however, in each of the above cases was appar-
ent. It might be a more difficult question to decide if the two offer-
ings should be integrated where, e.g., the types of securities were
similar but the consideration of the sale different, or where the
authorization of one plan of financing was given simultaneously,
but a relatively long period of time elapsed between the two offer-
ings. It seems safe enough to conclude that each case must be
considered on its individual facts when attempting to ascertain
whether two or more offerings should be integrated. The above are
not the only facts which might be utilized in examining offerings to
12 Loss, Securities Regulation 374 (1951).
CLOTHING
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ascertain if they are part of the same issue. The reader undoubtedly,
as each case is presented, will arrive at his own standard to check
against the facts of the case.
Another question related to the above problems is whether the
private offering exemption of section 4 (1)13 can be combined with
the exemption of section 3 (a) (11) where the only securities issued
under section 4 (1) were issued to "insiders"-officers, directors and
promoters. Should we treat the integration question any differently
when insiders are involved?
At one time it was thought that to avoid integration of an
offering to promoters with a cash public offering, it was necessary
that the shares to the promoters be issued only for property or ser-
vices. Thus, the crucial test applied was the consideration paid for
the securities by the insiders and by the public. This strict qualifica-
tion placed a difficult burden on the insiders since it was almost
impossible to finance the initial steps of the venture without some
cash expenditure. As a consequence there has grown the practice
of recognizing the existence of a private offering exemption in
connection with offerings to promoters for cash or otherwise, even
though such offering is made at or about the same time as the offer-
ing to the public. From this it might be concluded that there would
be no integration between the section 4(1) and section 3 (a) (11)
exemptions where the issuer upon organization issued stock to"non-resident" promoters and thereupon commenced a public offer-
ing relying on section 3(a) (11). However, each case must be
examined on its own facts to reach any conclusion and the reader is
cautioned of the pitfalls of generalization.
Still another variation of the problem arises in attempting to
determine whether to integrate a section 3 (a) (11) offering with a
registered offering. It would appear that the same standards would
be applicable as used in discussing integration with respect to two
exempt offerings, and should all or some of these factors be present,
the offering would be integrated and the exemption of section
3(a) (11) would not be available if the registered offering was
multi-state. The foregoing leads to the conclusion that section
3 (a) (11) is a one-way street-once it is used and relied upon,
the "issue" concept makes it difficult to return without admitting
possible liability for offering and selling unregistered and unexempt
securities.
The "doing business within" concept is also worthy of some
explanation. The issuer must be doing some business in the state
where the securities are to be offered, but it has been the general
view that it need not be confined to that state. The real issue
revolves around the question: How much business must be done by
an issuer to come within the intended meaning of the phrase in
order to qualify for the section 3(a) (11) exemption? It would
appear that the hypothetical mining company referred to above
must be performing substantial operations and conducting sub-
stantial activities in the state of incorporation and "residence" in
addition to bookkeeping and other functions before the "doing
1"48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77d (1956).
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business" concept would be satisfied. If all the properties were in
a state other than the one of incorporation, it would not, be unlikely
that this requirement of the section 3 (a) (11) exemption would be
missing and the exemption, therefore, would be unavailable. Again,
it is a factual matter to determine whether a company seeking to
use this exemption is "doing business" within the state of incorpora-
tion and each case must be decided on an ad hoc basis.
The most difficult language interpretative problem that exists
in section 3 (a) (11) is the one brought about by the use of the term
"persons resident within a single State or Territory."'1 4 It is essential
to ascertain just what Congress meant by the use of the term "resi-
dent," and more particularly, whether it meant "resident" to be
synonymous with "domicile." A discussion of some general proposi-
tions of law which define these terms is in order, and some discus-
sion on the difference between them will also prove helpful.
It is axiomatic that "domicile" and "residence" as a general
matter do not bear the same meaning. 15 Typically "domicile" has
been defined as "a residence at a particular place accompanied with
positive or presumptive proof of an intention to remain there for an
unlimited time." 16 Thus, the key factor seems to be that a person
have the necessary and requisite intent to make a certain place his
"home" or domicile. Domicile then is more inclusive than residence,
the latter referring to mere physical presence without an intent to
remain in a place for an indefinite period of time and without an
intent to make that place one's home or abode.
However, as in every area of the law where proof must be
taken on the state of mind of an individual, to establish this intent
physical and tangible evidence will be given credence, relying on
the age old maxim that "what you do speaks louder than what you
say." Thus, various factors are indicia of a person's intention to make
a particular locale his home. The following have been held highly
significant in attempting to ascertain intention to create a domicile:
(1) declaration and testimony regarding intent,
(2) place of voting,
(3) the nature of the position which brings one to or
keeps one in a particular locale,
(4) the type of habitat one has, i.e., has he purchased
a home, rented an apartment, or lived at a hotel,
(5) the presence of his personal chattels, e.g., furniture
and pets,
(6) the presence of his family and other dependents,
(7) the nature and extent of his participation in the
community, e.g., church, club and lodge memberships,
11 (Emphasis supplied.)
'5 District of Clumbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441 (1941); Mitchell v. United States, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
350 (1874); Owens v. Huntling 115 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1940); Sweeney v. District of Columbia, 113
F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied 310 U.S. 631 (1940); Lyons v. Egan, 110 Colo. 227, 132 P.2d
794 (1942); Join v. Bossen, 27 Colo. 423, 62 P.2d 194 (1900). See also, I Beale, Conflict of Laws
c. 2 (1934); Reese, Does Domicil Bear a Single Meaning, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 589 (1955); Tweed &
Sargent, Death & Taxes Are Certain-But What of Domicil, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 68 (1939); Annot., 148
A.L.R. 1413 (1944). However, in Fongman V. Movers, 90 Colo. 308, 8 P.2d 762 (1932) the court held
that it was unquestionably true that generally speaking "domicile" and residence were identical.
This isolated case does not appear to disturb the original conclusion, and it will be treated as only
an isolated statement contrary to the great weight of authority.
16 Mitchell v. United States, note 15 supra; District of Columbia v. Murphy, note 15 supra; Owens
v. Huntling, note 15 supra; Sweeney v. District of Columbia, note 15 supra; I Beale, Conflict of
Laws c. 2 (1934); Restatement, Conflict of Laws c. 2 (1934).
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(8) the place of his financial investments, location of
his savings and checking accounts, and location of the de-
pository of his salary,
(9) his relationship to his former place of abode-
what bridges has he kept and what has he burned,
(10) the retention of his former place of abode, and
finally,
(11) the jurisdiction to which he pays taxes and the
district where he files his federal income tax return.
7
If one claims his "domicile" to be in the State of Colorado and
his physical presence is in Michigan, he votes in Michigan, pays
Michigan income tax, has a home in Michigan, belongs to no organ-
izations or groups in Colorado but does in Michigan, and further
demonstrates by other actions that Michigan is his real "home," the
law will probably declare that his domicile is in Michigan despite
the fact that he contends to the contrary. Where, however, an indi-
vidual declares that his "domicile" is in a particular locale, this ex-
pression of his intent will be given great weight, and if his physical
manifestations of this intent concur with his declaration, undoubt-
edly no one would contest the place of his "domicile."
Once it is ascertained, under the above standards, where a per-
son's domicile is, determination must then be made of the legal
consequences which flow from this. Again the law seems quite clear;
a person may have only one domicile at one time.8 There are some
authors who feel that the term "domicile" does not bear a single
meaning and is not a unitary concept. Thus, they argue that a deter-
mination of a person's domicile should be based upon the context
of why we are attempting to determine his domicile, and that it may
be different for different purposes. However, these authors do agree
that a man may have only one domicile at a time under the law of
one state.' 9 This theory has not yet found its impact in the cases
which the writer has read, and for all purposes of this paper we will
assume what appears to be the weight of authority-that a person
may have only one domicile at one time for all purposes.
If "domicile" is a combination of physical presence and the
requisite intent, what of "residence"? This term has a far narrower
meaning than "domicile" and does not encompass the exhaustive
search into a man's mind to ascertain his intent. Professor Beale in
his treatise2 0 states that residence is merely a factual place of abode
and that a residence might be acquired in any particular locality
merely by physical presence, even for a short definite period of time
with an intent to remain in the place for the time being. This propo-
sition is generally borne out by the authorities.2' Thus, "domicile"
generally means a permanent status in a particular locale while
"residence" means probably nothing more than temporary presence
-regardless of the length of time of the temporary presence.
17 See District of Columbia v. Murphy, note 15 supra; 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 41-A (1935);
61 Harv. L. Rev. 1232 (1948) (note discussing the evidentiory factors in the determination of
domicile).
' See District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441 (1941); Mitchell v. United States, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 350 (1874); Lyons v. Egan, 110 Colo. 227, 132 P.2d 794 (1942); Restatement, Conflict of
Laws c. 2 (1934); 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws 87 (1935); Tweed & Sargent, supra note 15.1e See Reese, supra note 15; 61 Har". L. Rev. 1232 (1948).
20 Beale, Conflict of Laws c. 2 (1934).
21See note 15 supra. Also, Commissioner v. Swent, 155 F.2d 513 (4th Cir. 1946); Dwyer v.
Matson, 163 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1947).
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Flowing from this we note that as clear as the authorities are
that a man may have only one domicile at one time, they are equally
clear that he may have numerous residences at the same time.
2 2
Thus, a man with a home in New York, a winter home in Florida,
and a summer home in Colorado may be resident in all three states
but he may have only one domicile for legal purposes.
With this distinction between the terms "residence" and "domi-
cile," the crucial issue must be faced as to which of these terms Con-
gress meant in using the phrase "resident within a single State or
Territory . ." If it meant "domicile," then an offering and sale of
securities to a person who was a resident of Colorado but whose
domicile was in Michigan by an issuer incorporated in Colorado
would destroy the section 3 (a) (11) exemption. However, if Congress
meant "residence," then a domiciliary of the State of New York who
had a summer home in Colorado (assume enough to satisfy the resi-
dence test) may be offered and/or sold securities under this exemp-
tion. Likewise, this same issuer may offer or sell these securities to
a Michigan domiciliary who was also a resident of Colorado under
the section 3 (a) (11) exemption. If this were carried to its logical
conclusion, it would be possible to have securities holders domiciled
in all forty-eight states in a company whose public offering was
made under section 3 (a) (11). Surely this was not the Congressional
intent in enacting the section 3 (a) (11) exemption.
Perhaps the phrase "within a single State or Territory .... -23
might be used to demonstrate that "resident within" is synonymous
with domicile. The use of the word "single" makes the writer think
that Congress intended to restrict the offer and sale of securities to
people who were, as a matter of law, present and situate in only one
state. The real purpose of this exemption, therefore, was to permit
local financing for local industry without the necessity of filing a
registration statement. Surely, then, if an issuer were permitted to
sell in all forty-eight states to people who merely had a bare resi-
dence in the state of incorporation while domiciled elsewhere, the
financing would not be local to those persons. However, if it can be
concluded that since this was the purpose of the section 3(a) (11)
exemption, it would follow that Congress really meant to restrict
= See District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441 (1941); Dwyer v. Matson, note 21 supro;
Lyons v. Egan, 110 Colo. 227, 132 P.2d 794 (1942); Restatement, Conflict of Laws c. 2 (1934); 1
Beale, Conflict of Laws, note 15 supra; Annot., 148 A.L.R. 1413 (1944).
(Emphasis supplied.)
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the sales to persons "domiciled" in the state of the issuer's ircorpor-
ation. Since, as a matter of law, a person can have only one domicile
at one time, it would seem that this concept would be more closely
akin to the "single State or Territory" language in section 3 (a) (11).
Unfortunately the writer has found no case interpreting section
3 (a) (11) on this issue and the above would only be argumentative
to a court of law.
Even more unfortunate is that draftsmen of statutes and legal
instruments do not always use the terms "domicile" and "residence"
in their true legal sense. Thus, it is possible that where the term
"residence" is used, the statute or instrument really meant "domi-
cile"; of course, the reverse of the situation may also be true. The
authorities bear out this interchanging use of these two terms and
generally hold that in each instance where an interpretation is
essential, the individual statute and facts must be examined to
ascertain intent. "The word 'residence' is often used in statutes.
When it is so used, there is room for difference of interpretation. As
used in a statute, the word may mean a domicile; or it may mean a
dwelling place, which lacks the legal requirements of domicile.
24
In Sweeney v. District of Columbia," the court said, in discussing
the use of the term "resident" in a statute, that "without more, its
normal and usual meaning is 'domiciled.' 2,6 In Commissioner v.
Swent,27 the court, in holding persons to be residents of the United
States for income tax purposes, said that sometimes "residence"
means "domicile" and since the residence of an individual is gener-
ally the same place as his domicile, they are frequently used as if
they are synonymous, but they clearly are not identical. The Tenth
Circuit held in Dwyer v. Matson28 that the term "residence" may
have many meanings and that the issue in each statute is to ascertain
in what sense the word "residence" is used, i.e., is it temporary resi-
dence or is it permanent or domiciliary residence that is required?
A similar holding appears in Downs v. Commissioner,2 9 where the
court said, "The meaning of the word 'resident' is not always exactly
the same, and its true meaning in a statute must be understood in
connection with its context and with the legislative purpose. 80
These cases would be helpful in explaining away the use of the
term "resident" in the statute in an argument that Congress really
meant "domicile" and with all the legal consequences which flow
from a use of this term. Thus, an argument could be made that would
free one from being held to the conclusion that when Congress used
the term "resident within" they meant "residence" rather than "do-
micile." A combination of the argument setting forth the purposes
of section 3 (a) (11) with these cases would possibly persuade a court
that domicile in its strict legal sense was intended.
Professor Loss has stated that the Securities and Exchange
Commission has construed residence to mean domicile in the con-
4 See I Beale, Conflict of Lows 110 (1935).
113 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 631 (1940).
Id at 27.
155 F.2d 513 (4th Cir. 1946).
163 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1947).
116 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1948).
"Id. at 507.
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flict-of-laws sense.3' He also has stated that since the statute does
not define residence, and since the Commission's construction that
"residence" really means "domicile" in the strict legal sense has
been unchallenged for a number of years, no issue is anticipated to
be raised at this time. Professor Loss also has asserted in the 1955
supplement to his treatise that the exemption has not been consid-
ered available unless the entire issue of securities were offered and
sold exclusively to persons domiciled in the one state32
However, a decision which might persuade a court to take a
contrary position was found in Owens v. Huntling.8 3 The court in
this case was called upon to construe the terms in an Oregon statute
"resident within the state of Oregon,' ' 3 and specifically whether it
means "domicile" or "residence" in the strict legal sense. The court
held that if the Oregon legislature intended "resident within the
State" to mean "domicile within the state," it would have said so.
The court went on to say that even the word "residence," which is
sometimes considered synonymous with "domicile" was not used,
and that "resident within" is equivalent to "residing within" and
"domicile" was not intended. The above case is particularly signifi-
cant in light of the fact that section 3 (a) (11) also uses the language
"resident within" a state. It certainly would be possible for a court
31 Loss, Securities Regulation 379, n. 252 (1951).
32 Loss, Securities Regulation 163, addition to note 247 (Supp. 1955). See, also, S. Rep. No. 1036
at 13 and H. R. Rep. No. 1542 at 22, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) where the legislative committee
referred to persons "domiciled" in the one state.
83 115 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1940).





to follow the Owens case and hold that if Congress meant domicile,
with all its legal consequences and significance, they would have
said so.
However, the writer still believes that in light of the probable
purpose of section 3 (a) (11) and with the interjection of the term"single" to modify "State or Territory," an effective argument could
be made to persuade a court to hold that domicile with all its legal
consequences was intended.
Assuming, for argumentative purposes, that a court would
agree that "resident within" means "domicile," attention must be
given to the specific issue of whether military personnel stationed
in a state acquire, by virtue of their presence, a domicile in that
state. As a general proposition, the determination of the residence
of military personnel is the same as that for non-military people.
Thus, the physical presence in a particular locality coupled with the
requisite intent will establish domicile. The peculiar problem which
arises where the military are concerned comes when an attempt is
made to determine if the mere presence of a soldier in a state where
he is stationed for an indefinite period of time is sufficient to make
him a domiciliary of that state.
It is generally held that the domicile of a person in the military
service remains at the place where he entered the service, absent
express intention to the contrary. 5 Thus, a soldier under orders at
a particular camp with no express intent to remain in the state
after his military service is over will generally not acquire domicile
in that state. The real key seems to be that military personnel are
in a particular place not voluntarily, but under orders, and thus the
requisite intent probably has not been formed. There is also the fact
that at any time a soldier might be ordered to a different military
post, and thus his tenure in any particular locality is probably any-
thing but permanent.
However, it is also clear that with the requisite intent a person
in the military can change his domicile to the place where he is sta-
tioned. He must form the necessary intent and demonstrate this
intent by sufficient physical acts to manifest such intent. Here,
though, the demonstration of intent must be apart from his military
status. Thus if he chooses to remain in the particular state where
he is stationed, and if ordered elsewhere he intends to return, it is
not impossible to acquire a domicile. Professor Beale says "he
[speaking of military personnel] cannot acquire a domicile in an
army post."36 Therefore, if he is ordered to live within the military
reservation in quarters provided, Beale says he cannot acquire domi-
cile. The writer is of the opinion, unsubstantiated by competent
authority, that this is carrying the intent concept beyond all bounds.
Even if ordered to dwell on the post, it seems that the necessary
intent could be formed and if the necessary acts demonstrate this
intent, a soldier might very well be domiciled in the state. It seems
easier to see the acquisition of domicile if the soldier lives with his
family off the post at a place in the community where he chooses.
7 Humphrey v. Fort Knox Transit Co., 58 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Ky. 1945) (dicta); Wise v. Bolster,
31 F. Supp. 856 (W.D. Wash. 1939); Annot., 148 A.L.R. 1413 (1944); 28 Minn. L. Rev. 69 (1943); 1
Beale, Conflict of Lows § 21.2 (1935); Restatement, Conflict of Lows § 21 (1934).
se1 Beale, Conflict of Lows 155 (1934).
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However, this merely goes to the proof of establishing domicile and
does not enter into the substantive issue of what will create domi-
cile.
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that the physical presence of a
soldier in a state does not per se operate to establish a new domicile
-the necessary factor of intent must be formed and present to
accomplish this.
One case in particular bears specific mention since it was de-
cided first by the Supreme Court of Colorado and later reversed on
appeal by the United States Supreme Court. In Cass v. Dameron,
7
the Treasurer of the City and County of Denver assessed the tangible
personal property of Dameron, an officer stationed at Lowry Air
Force Base in Denver. Dameron relied for his defense, in protesting
the assessment, on the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act, 8 which
in essence stated that a soldier shall not lose his domicile for personal
property taxes because he is stationed at a particular place. The
issue which the Colorado Supreme Court faced was whether Denver
had jurisdiction over the person and property of Dameron to levy
the tax. The Colorado court, after admitting that Dameron was
domiciled in a state other than Colorado, concluded that the purpose
of the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act was to avoid multiplicity
of taxes and since Louisiana, Dameron's state of domicile, did not
tax the property, Colorado was within its right to do so. Dameron
appealed to the United States Supreme Court and in Dameron v.
Brodhead, 9 that court reversed the Colorado court. The Supreme
Court held that the avoidance of double taxation was not the intent
of the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act, but rather it was to free
servicemen from both income and property taxes imposed by any
state by virtue of their presence as a result of military orders.
Admittedly this case is not on all fours with our issue but it
might be indicative of the attitude of the Supreme Court, i.e., that
military personnel are not domiciliary citizens by virtue of physical
presence under military orders. It is not unlikely that the same
conclusion could be reached when the issue of the domicile of
military personnel arises for purposes of section 3 (a) (11).
An analogous situation is the status of persons who go to work
a' 125 Colo. 477, 244 P.2d 1092 (1952).
w 58 Stat. 722 (1944); 50 U.S.C. Appendix 574 (1951).




for the federal government and by virtue of this live in the District
of Columbia. Are they domiciled in the District or do they retain
their original residence from whence they came? Of course, no
categorical answer can be given. In Sweeney v. District of Colum-
bia,40 the court held that federal employees who come to work in
Washington, D.C. would generally retain their domicile in the state
from which they came, unless they give clear evidence of their in-
tention to forego their state allegiance. The court thought it quite
significant that federal duty and service requires residential pres-
ence in the District. In a dictum the court said that, "military and
naval men, it was conceded, would retain domicile in the state of
residence at the time of appointment."'4 , So an argument by analogy
in the military situation might be made to the effect that employ-
ment under orders or a requirement to live in a particular place
would not create a domicile for the persons so ordered or employed.
A similar view was held by the United States Supreme Court in
District of Columbia v. Murphy,4' where this Court categorically
stated that, "a man does not acquire a domicile in the District simply
by coming here to live for an indefinite period of time while in the
Government service."'43 Thus, if such is the view with respect to
civilian employees who leave their state of original domicile, would
not the same view be adopted with respect to military personnel?
Although restricted to the issue of voting and eligibility to pub-
lic office, Article VII, §4 of the Constitution of the State of Colorado
says that no person shall gain "residence" by reason of his presence
while in the civil or military service of the state or of the United
States. This might show a trend toward holding that military per-
sonnel, at least for some purposes, are not domiciled in Colorado. A
similar view might be adopted under section 3 (a) (11).
There is some authority which indicates that military personnel
are unable to acquire domicile on a military reservation under the
jurisdiction of the federal government although the reservation is
situated within the borders of the state."4 However, this would have
very limited application since the soldier could probably acquire
domicile in the state by forming the necessary intent coupled with
physical acts to manifest this intent. This theory would have such
limited application that it does not bear further consideration at
this time.
Two final refinements on the residence issue remain to be dis-
cussed. First, what should be the effect of a subscription agreement
used by an issuer attempting to rely on the section 3 (a) (11) exemp-
tion, which states that the subscriber-purchaser warrants that he is
a resident of a particular state and that if it should later be deter-
mined that the contrary is true, the sale and subscription is void? An
agreement such as this would tend to demonstrate an awareness on
the part of the issuer that section 3 (a) (11) is quite limited in scope
and must be restricted to persons "resident within a single State or
Territory." However, the availability of the exemption depends
upon the facts of the situation and despite any attempt to undo an
,o 113 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 631 (1940).
a Id. at 29.
"314 U.S. 441 (1941).
aId. at 454.
"See Annot., 148 A.L.R. 1413 (1944).
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offer and sale to a non-resident, such a sale would technically
vitiate any exemption. A subsequent avoiding of the contract would
merely demonstrate an attempt to comply but would not be a sub-
stitute for actual compliance. It would appear that the mere obtain-
ing of residence and investment representations will not establish
the availability of the exemption.
The second refinement arises where the securities are taken in
joint names, either as tenants-in-common or as joint tenants with
the right of survivorship. It would seem clear that if each co-owner
paid his pro-rata share for his interest, both must be "residents" of
the state of incorporation of the issuer. Merely because one is, will
not excuse the other or change the concept of "residence" in order
to claim the exemption. A problem comes when the securities are
taken in joint names but the total consideration is paid by the "rasi-
dent" purchaser. Here it might be concluded that the sale was made
to the resident and a gift of an undivided interest of the securities
was then given by such person to the non-resident. Since the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 does not contemplate jurisdiction with respect to
gifts of securities, if such was the case, such a procedure would not
vitiate the exemption. At least the equity in this latter case would
be toward holding the exemption available.
The foregoing has attempted to point up a number of problems
which exist in attempting to interpret the language used in section
3 (a) (11), the most serious, of course, being the "residence" ques-
tion. A conclusion of this problem is most difficult to draw, but it
would appear that once a court was convinced that "resident within
a single State or Territory" meant domicile in its legal sense, it
would follow that all offers and sales must be to persons who live
in only one state and who have intended to make such state their
indefinite permanent place of abode-i.e., domiciled within. With
respect to the military problem, each case of an investor must be
taken on an individual basis with a view toward examining the facts
in order to ascertain his actual intent with respect to his domicile.
Depending on the facts, arguments could be made either way.
Attention will now be directed to the problems caused by sec-
tion 3 (a) (11) which are other than language interpretation.
III. MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
A. Trading v. Distributing
A problem which is somewhat akin to the residence question is
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state and then an interstate market is subsequently created. Specifi-
cally, will the sale by the resident investors to non-residents vitiate
the section 3 (a) (11) exemption for the issuer or cause a registered
broker-dealer to aid in violating section 5 of the Securities Act of
1933, as amended? In other words, when does the distribution end
and the trading begin?
The first expression of official policy on this issue was promul-
gated by the Federal Trade Commission when this agency was
charged with the obligation of administering the securities laws. A
public release by this agency stated that "in order that the exemp-
tion of section 3(a) (11) may be available for securities of any
issue, it is clearly required that the securities at the time of com-
pletion of ultimate distribution shall be found only in the hands of
investors resident within the state. Ultimate distribution, in the
opinion of the Commission, was declared to consist not only in the
delivery of the bonds from the issuer to the underwriters, and the
delivery of the bonds from the underwriters to sub-underwriters
and to dealers, but also in the disposition of the bonds in the hands
of investors in any secondary distribution which might take place
pursuant to arrangements by the issuer or underwriters."4 5
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The only reported decision discussing this issue is found in
Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp.48 In this case the Brooklyn Man-
hattan Transit Corp. applied for the registering or listing of their
bonds on the New York Stock Exchange and the Commission re-
fused. In order to "clear the air" on the reason for this denial, the
Commission held a hearing, obtained evidence, and issued the
opinion in this case. Briefly, the facts found were that the Brooklyn
Manhattan Transit Corp. desired to issue $8,000,000 in bonds through
the use of the intrastate exemption of section 3 (a) (11) in order to
avoid the necessity of registering. A large block of these bonds was
sold to four banking firms in New York City and these firms, in
turn, sold a portion of them to approximately fourteen dealers, all
in New York City, who purchased for their own account. These
dealers and the four banking houses then proceeded to distribute
the bonds to both residents and to non-residents, the former group
also re-distributing to other non-residents. The Commission found
that within one day after the bids were accepted, non-residents had
title to the bonds and that approximately 15% of these bonds were
held by non-residents within a short time after the sale commenced.
Counsel for the Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp. argued that
the sale of the bonds to the four banking houses (who were admit-
tedly underwriters) and then to the fourteen dealers was sufficient
to give the bonds the character of "an issue sold only to persons resi-
dent within a single State [New York] ."
The Commission in its opinion held that the 1933 Act is primar-
ily concerned with distribution as distinguished from trading. It
further went on to say that the position of the Brooklyn Manhattan
Transit Corp. was "wholly untenable" since the adoption of their
view would be a simple device of avoiding the registration proce-
dures by making an original sale of a new security issue to one
person residing in the same state as the issuer, followed by an im-
mediate interstate distribution. The Commission went on to say this
control over the distribution was essential and that it is the sales
during the distribution which are to be taken into consideration in
determining whether the issue is sold only to residents of one state.
Thus, the holding in this case would lead one to conclude that the
statute does not contemplate control over only original sales by the
issuer but contemplates such control over all sales during the course
of a distribution. However, the holding also indicates that the
statute does not contemplate a consideration of every sale from the
issue date to the time when the securities are retired by the issuer.
The difficult question is at what point does distribution end and
trading begin? "The point at which such distribution is completed is
a question of fact to be determined in the light of all the circum-
stances of the offering. ' '47
Fortunately, however, the Commission did suggest some stan-
dard on which to determine the point at which the distribution has
ended. It said that since the third clause of section 4(1) of the 1933
Act requires the use of the prospectus for a period of one year (this
has now been changed by the 1954 amendments to forty days) 4 8 after
461 S.E.C. Dec. 147 (1935).
47 See note 46 supra at 162.
4848 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77d (1956).
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the first date the security was bona fide offered to the public by the
issuer or by or through an underwriter, an analogous situation exists
in determining when the distribution has or has not ended for sec-
tion 3 (a) (11) purposes. Thus, the inferencelcan be drawn that after
a year had expired, a sale by a resident to a non-resident would
probably not destroy the section 3 (a) (11) exemption.
Since, as stated above, the 1954 amendments changed the one-
year period in section 4(1) to forty days, an interesting question
arises as to whether the Commission would substitute, for the pur-
pose of section 3(a) (11), the forty day period. Professor Loss says
that it does not necessarily follow that this would be the Commis-
sion's policy.49 Although conjecture is of little value, it would appear
that the forty day period now found in section 4 (1) of the 1933 act
will not displace the one-year rule applied in the Brooklyn Manhat-
tan Transit Corp. case.
From the foregoing it seems clear that if any underwriter, any
distributing dealer, or any dealer purchasing with a view to resale,
or even a substantial investor (not a person in the business of buy-
ing and selling securities for the account of others), purchased from
the issuer, and within a relatively short period of time sold to non-
residents, the distribution would still be continuing and the exemp-
tion of section 3 (a) (11) defeated."0 It certainly would appear that
the development of an interstate market shortly after the initial
offering would cast doubt upon the claimed exemption.
Short of this factual situation, as when a small investor resells
to a non-resident after some time, more difficulty is encountered.
The real question is one of fact to determine whether the securities
have actually come to rest in the hands of residents who purchased
without a view to further distribution. Once this conclusion is
reached, the sales may be made to non-residents without affecting
the section 3 (a) (11) exemption-i.e., at this point trading com-
mences and the distribution is ended. All the facts must be taken
into consideration, i.e., the proximity in time between the purchase
and sale, the character of the purchaser, whether he is a professional
broker or dealer or merely an investor, and the amount of securities
purchased, before we can ascertain whether the distribution has
ended.
Unfortunately, no clear answer can be given to determine when
a distribution ends and trading begins. All factors must be exam-
ined to permit one to conclude that the distribution went to only
residents of one state.
B. Installment Buying of Securities
As in all other commodities on the market, the installment pur-
chase program has reached securities. Thus, the issue is raised con-
cerning a purchaser of securities on the installment plan who
changes his residence or domicile after the original agreement to
49 Loss, Securities Regulation 163, addition to note 248 (Supp. 1955).
o SEC, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 1459 (1937).
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buy the securities, but prior to the completion of all his payments.
Will the continued acceptance of the payments by the issuer from
this non-resident be deemed to be a sale to a non-resident so as to
destroy the section 3 (a) (11) exemption?
Again, the writer has found no authority to assist in answering
this problem. The legal issue would seem to revolve around the
terms and conditions of the original subscription agreement. If from
a reading of this instrument it can be ascertained that the total sale
was consummated at the inception, i.e., while the purchaser was a
resident, and that the contract was not severable or separable, it
would appear that the subsequent move would not vitiate the section
3 (a) (11) exemption even though the issuer continued to accept the
payments as they came due. However, if it appears that the agree-
ment is severable, so that each time the purchaser remits his pay-
ments a new sale is consummated, the continued acceptance of the
installment payments would probably destroy the seclon 3 (a) (11)
exemption.
Thus, an agreement which sets forth a guaranteed surrender
value for the money paid by the purchaser might lead one to con-
clude that a, new sale takes place after each or a number of pay-
ments, and that the continued acceptance of the payments from
this non-resident might destroy the exemption. Surely it would not
be difficult to conclude that a new offer is made each time a pay-
ment comes due and a new decision is reached by the investor to
purchase or not to purchase. Again, no definitive standard can be
outlined but each agreement and case must be examined on an indi-
vidual basis.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing has attempted to point up some of the problems
which exist in interpreting and analyzing section 3(a) (11). It
should be obvious to the reader at this point that in very few in-
stances can definite general conclusions be drawn when studying
this section.
Each situation must be taken as an individual one and the
problems decided on an ad hoc basis. The lack of any judicial de-
cision on this section adds to our dilemma, and some definite stan-
dard to guide one's conduct in attempting to utilize section 3 (a) (11)
of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, is sorely needed.
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DENVER'S NEW MUNICIPAL COURT UNIFORM
SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT AND
CALENDAR COURT DIVISION
By GERALD E. McAULIFFE
Hon. Gerald E. McAuliffe has
served as Presiding Municipal
Judge in the Denver court system
since 1952. He received his LL. B.
degree from Westminster College
of Law in 1.930 and was admitted
to practice in Colorado the same
year. From 1931 through 1934 he
was Assistant City Attorney. While
serving in the Colorado Legislature
he was Chairman of the Criminal
Affairs Committee and of the Judi-
ciary Committee. From June 1938
to early 1940 he was Assistant At-
torney General of Colorado, and
from 1942 through 1951 he served
with the Anti-Trust Division of the
United States Department of Jus-
tice. Since 1952 he has been reap-
pointed annually as Presiding Mu-
nicipal Judge. The judge is a mem-
ber of the Colorado, Denver and
American Bar Associations, a mem-
ber of the Traffic Court Committee
of the Colorado Bar Association, a
member of the Committee on Traf-
fic Courts of the Section on Judicial
Administration of the American Bar
Association, a member of the May-
or's Traffic Coordinating Commit-
tee in Denver, and a member of the
Governor's "Colorado Citizen's Traf-
fic Safety Committee."
The Denver Uniform Traffic Summons and Complaint was insti-
tuted in Denver on January 1, 1957. This action placed the City of
Denver and the Denver Municipal Court in compliance with recom-
mendations previously made by the American Bar Association, the
National Safety Council and the President's White House Safety
Conference. Simultaneously, a Calendar Division of the Denver
Municipal Court was created and established to function in conjunc-
tion with the new system.
August 31, 1957, marked the end of the first eight-full-month's
operation under the new program. From its very beginning, there
has been a close and constant observation maintained of the actual
workings of the Uniform Summons and Complaint - Calendar
Court Division and certain revisions have been accomplished as dic-
tated by circumstances. One major revision was found necessary
with respect to the initial formula for determining unit values re-
garding the several hazardous conditions listed on the face of the
summons and this correction was accomplished effective January 16,
1957, and publicized at that time. The underlying reason for that
particular change was that it became apparent in our early exper-
iences that the original formula was resulting in unreasonable penal-
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ties in some instances, especially with respect to the offenses of
"illegal turns." That fault was adequately corrected by the revision
of January 16.
In explaining the essential parts of the new program, this matter
will be discussed hereinafter in two separate parts: A. The Denver
Uniform Summons and Complaint, and B. The Calendar Court
Division, Denver Municipal Court.
A. THE DENvER UNIFORM SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT
The combined Summons-Complaint is pre-numbered and con-
sists of four parts:
1) The face of the original is a legal complaint and on its
reverse side is contained a space for the docket entries
usually required in traffic court cases. This is the copy that
is filed and used in court;
2) The second part is an exact copy of the face of the com-
plaint; while on its reverse side are spaces for the report of
convictioh, if any, and other pertinent information for trans-
mittal to the State Motor Vehicle Department. This is the
State's copy;
3) The third copy is the police record with the reverse side
providing space for the entry of dispositions for use in
maintaining statistics by the Police Department. This is the
Police Department's copy;
4) The fourth is the alleged violator's copy and is identical
with the other three except it is headed "summons"; while
on the reverse side thereof is contained information for the
benefit of the person charged, or his attorney, showing
exactly which offenses require mandatory court appear-
ances and those in which he may, in certain cases if he de-
sires to plead guilty and waive trial, appear in the clerk's
office for payment of fixed penalties or, in some cases,
have the citation excused as a warning in advance of the
return time specified on the face of the summons.
The outstanding feature of the new uniform Summons and
Complaint is the selection and designation therein of the five spe-
cific offenses which contribute heavily as the cause of accidents in
Denver-i.e.:
a) Speeding
b) Illegal left turn
c) Illegal right turn
d) Disobeyed traffic signal when light turned red
e) Disobeyed stop sign.
Actually setting forth those five charges without supplying ad-
ditional information would only serve to perpetuate the omission of
the information lacking in the traffic ticket form previously in use
here in Denver. Consequently, each of these five charges is further
analyzed by separating them into three degrees of seriousness. The
first column in the rectangular box on the left of the Summons-
Complaint corresponds to what most persons refer to as a "technical
violation." It would, therefore, constitute the least degree of.serious-
ness. Logically, we would then ascertain what act or driving maneu-
ver was the most serious and this is represented by the column on
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the extreme right of the same box. Anything beyond this degree of
violation is in aggravation of the most serious circumstance accord-
ing to the standards of the average motorist. To complete the an-
alysis, a "middle" serious column is provided to cover situations in
this in-between stage. By employing words descriptive of these dif-
ferent degrees which are readily understandable by police officers,
prosecutors, lawyers, judges, driver licensing authorities, driver
training instructors and motorists, as well as to representatives of
the press, radio, television and other communications media, an
awareness of some of the problems incidental to traffic law enforce-
ment is created. Thus, it could be said that the first column repre-
sents "serious"; the next column "more serious"; and the third col-
umn "most serious." The exact offenses with the three degrees of
seriousness are actually listed in the Denver Uniform Summons and
Complaint as follows:
Speeding [ 5 m.p.h.
(over limit) 507.2
( ---------- m.p.h. in --------------- m .p.h.













































As can be seen by the above, the fifteen descriptions of illegal
and unsafe maneuvers set forth therein, and in and of themselves
informative, can and, it is hoped, will become a medium of con-
tinuing education to the motorist in violation. Many times a tech-
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serious in and of itself or standing alone will become so only by
reason of existing conditions which add to or increase the hazard
of the objectionable driving maneuver. Experience proves that the
three most important conditions present in accident summaries are:
(1) visibility or darkness, (2) slippery pavement, and (3) other
traffic present.
At least three separate circumstances under each of these con-
ditions are dangerous and should be considered in order to determine
the seriousness of the offense and to assist in arriving at an appro-
priate and realistic penalty. Consequently, the conditions listed in
the second large rectangular box on the right side of the Uniform
Summons and Complaint are designed to appear to the alleged
violator as representative words meaning "danger" or "hazard." The
conditions in that box emphasize the premise that traffic laws are
designed to prevent accidents on the streets and highways, thus re-
ducing the number of such accidents with their usually resultant
crippling injuries and deaths plus property damage. Any near miss
is a threat to public safety and amounts to a serious condition which
not only the motorist but the police and courts should consider in
arriving at a proper evaluation of the offense and the resulting
penalty. If the thing that the traffic laws are designed to prevent,
i.e., an accident, actually occurs, however, then that fact means the
matter has become far more serious and this, too is an important
feature which should be taken into consideration. Appropriate
space for accident information has, therefore, been provided. De-
scriptive words as to the area through which the streets or highways
traverse and boxes for the officer to designate the type of highway
complete the blank spaces for insertion of the exact factual condi-
tions present at the time of the alleged violation. Thus, the exact
conditions which increase the seriousness of the violation are listed
in the Denver Uniform Summons and Complaint as follows:
Conditions that increased
Seriousness of Violation
SLIPPERY (0 Rain CAUSED IN ACCIDENT
PAVEMENT (E] Snow PERSON E) Ped.
(E] Ice TO DODGE E] Vehicle
VISIBILITY (El Night El Pedestrian E] Intersection
(E] Fog El Driver El Right angle
(El Rain JUST MISSED [- Head on
(F1 Snow ACCIDENT E] Sideswipe
OTHER ([I Cross El El Rear end
TRAFFIC (El Oncoming El Ran-off
PRESENT (E Pedes- roadway
trian El Hit fixed
([ Same object
direction
AREA: El Business E] Industrial [] School El Residential
] Rural
HIGHWAY TYPE: ] 2-lane El 3-lane E] 4-lane
El 4-lane divided El One-way street
From the above, it should be evident that every element re-
quired to prove any of the five selected offenses appears on the face
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of the summons and complaint. The police officer has no excuse for
failing to note them before handing the accused motorist his copy of
the summons. The alleged violator, in turn, has an opportunity to
know the exact nature of the charge against him and conditions
claimed to have existed at that time and place. He has been thus
given what amounts to a detailed "Bill of Particulars"! He, there-
fore, has an early opportunity to prepare his defense because he
knows precisely what he must answer. Consequently, since the mo-
torist knows the exact charge placed against him, he is better in-
formed and thus in a better position and more able to intelligently
make a decision as to whether he should enter a plea of guilty or not
guilty to the charge.
Following along on the foregoing line of reasoning, the first
column in the left rectangle, since it relates to the least serious of-
fenses, has consequently been assigned a unit value of one single
unit for each offense checked; the second column, i.e., the more ser-
ious column has been assigned a value of two units for each offense
checked; while the third, i.e., the most serious has been assigned a
value of three units for each offense checked. With respect to the
'onditions which increase the seriousness of the violation, as set
torth in the right hand rectangle, a unit value of one, two and three
respectively has been assigned to each grouping in the three col-
umns. Each unit has been assigned a monetary value of $4.00. The
first offender, receiving a summons indicating two units or less, will
be excused as a warning provided he appears at the clerk's office at
any time prior to the return time specified in the summons and there
signs a plea of guilty and waiver of trial. Payments of fixed fines
for six units or less may be paid in the clerk's office by following
that same identical procedure. Certain offenses described on the
back of the motorist's copy require mandatory court appearances as
do also those in which the units total up to seven or more. Separate
and apart from the five offenses listed in the summons and com-
plaint, there has been provided a space at the bottom for the officer
to designate other alleged violations as warranted by the facts. So
the recipient will be fully informed of the charge, if made in this
manner, on the reverse side of the violator's copy of the summons
will be found a complete description by section numbers and word
definitions of specific traffic offenses over and above the five set
forth in the body of the complaint. In addition to the five presently
Best Wishes to the Bar Association
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listed in the Denver Uniform Summons and Complaint, a sixth
traffic offense which is listed in the American Bar Association model
form is being considered and probably will be added in the very near
future. This sixth offense is "Improper Passing and Lane Usage."
The Denver Uniform Traffic Summons and Complaint has many
important advantages over the previous arbitrary and non-realistic
ticket procedure used in Denver, chiefly among which it:
a) Permits calendar and trial judges to arrive at more
uniform penalizations in court upon plea of guilty or finding
of guilty after trial and will, in all cases, relate the penalty,
if any, more closely to the actual offense committed;
b) Minimizes and probably reduces a possibility that
the fines for hazardous violations will be allowed to become
delinquent as frequently happened under the former un-
satisfactory ticket procedure;
c) Permits uniform interpretation of city traffic laws
by all police officers;
d) Permits uniformity of instructions to all police
officers and administrative personnel within the Police
Department.
e) Permits prosecutors to secure more consistent and
uniform case preparation;.
f) Acquaints the alleged violator and/or his attorney
with the exact nature of the violation charged; and
g) Acquaints the motoring public with the particular
unsafe maneuvers which are causing the accidents in Den-
ver with attendant injury, death and property damage.
B. THE CALENDAR COURT DIVISION-DENVER MUNICIPAL COURT
1) Certain offenses require mandatory appearance in the newly
created Calendar Court Division. They are:
a) Leaving the scene of an accident;
b) Operation of a motor vehicle while under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic or drug;
c) Operation of a motor vehicle without a valid oper-
ator's license or while license is under denial, cancellation,
suspension or revocation;
d) Reckless driving;
e) Any offense resulting in personal injury or property
damage (accident);
f) Taking the right-of-way from emergency vehicle;
g) Third moving offense within a twelve-months'
period;
h) Speeding in excess of twenty miles an hour over
the speed limit; and
i) Seven or more units.
2) If any person who is charged with traffic violations, other
than those listed in No. 1 above, wishes to plead guilty and waive
trial, he or she may bring the summons, at any time prior to the
court appearance time noted on the face of the summons, to the
Clerk of the Traffic Court, Room 201, West Side Court Building, at
West Colfax and Kalamath Streets, anytime between 8:00 A.M. and
5:00 P.M. daily, Monday through Friday.
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3) When a person appears at the Clerk's Office, pursuant to
paragraph No. 2 above, the records will be checked and a determina-
tion made as to whether the alleged offense is in the warning cate-
gory or, if not, then whether payment of a fine is acceptable in the
Clerk's Office or whether the matter is such as requires a mandatory
court appearance.
If in the "excuse or warning" category, or if payment of fine
is acceptable in the Clerk's Office pursuant to the procedure listed
in No. 3 above, the matter may be disposed of immediately if the
motorist: (a) Turns in his summons to the Clerk after signing there-
on the plea of guilty and waiver of trial, and (b) Pays the total fine
established by the court for the offense charged (unless the matter
adds up to a "warning" only).
If the matter is more serious than the "warning" category or
if payment of a fine in the Clerk's Office is not acceptable, then and
in that event the recipient of the summons will be required to appear
in the Calendar Division at the date and time specified in the original
summons.
If a summons adds up to a mandatory court appearance before
the calendar judge, the recipient or his attorney will ordinarily,
upon request, in open court, except as hereinafter expressly men-
tioned, be given one week's continuance in the arraingment date.
A reasonable opportunity will be given defendants and/or
their attorneys to examine any and all reports and records pertain-
ing to the case (excepting records of arrest and prior traffic viola-
tion records) at the time of arraignment and prior to being required
DEFENDERS OF HEALTH AND COMFORT
PLUMBING, HEATING AND
COOLING CONTRACTORS
These seals are your guarantee of quality work by reliable
plumbing, heating and cooling contractors. Look for them in
the yellow pages of your phone book.
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to enter a plea to the charges, i.e., the original complaint, visual so-
briety and accident reports, blood alcohol analysis certificate and
so forth.
The Calendar Division convenes twice daily at 8:30 A.M. and
1:30 P.M. Each session is opened with an informative and educa-
tional explanation by the calendar judge, setting forth the procedure
which will be followed plus specific information regarding the basic
and fundamental rights of the defendant.
Then follows a statement by the calendar judge explaining the
exact procedure and order of business. By way of conclusion, the
Calendar Division judge explains the purpose and intent of traffic
law enforcement, setting forth pertinent statistics-i.e.: (a) 40,000
persons killed in traffic accidents in the United States last year; (b)
16,000 accidents occurred in Denver during 1956, which represented
an increase of approximately 2,000 accidents over the preceding year
of 1955; (c) 3,000 persons injured in those 16,000 accidents; (d)
thirty-eight persons killed in traffic accidents in this city last year
of which nineteen were pedestrians.
No witnesses will appear or testify and no trials will be
conducted during sessions of the Calendar Court Division. However,
the recipient of a summons entering a plea of guilty in said Calendar
Division, or his attorney, may make an oral statement in mitigation,
if desired. If the plea is guilty before the calendar judge, the matter
will be disposed of at that same session of court upon examination
and consideration of all supporting documentary material that may
be relevant to each individual case, i.e., complaint, accident report,
and other matter.
If the plea before the calendar judge is not guilty, the matter
cannot be disposed of at that same session of court, but will
ordinarily (unless exceptional circumstances exist) be set over to
some future date for trial, allowing both the city and the defendant
reasonable time to procure witnesses and prepare for trial.
If an attorney is retained in advance of the original arraign-
ment date, and so desires, he or she may arrange postponement of
the arraignment itself, not to exceed one week's duration, by con-
tacting personally the Calendar Division clerk. Requests for contin-
uance in the arraignment, exceeding one week, must be presented
to the Calendar Division judge.
If an attorney is retained in advance of the arraignment
date and is desirous of entering a plea of not guilty and asking for
trial upon the merits, he or she may enter a not guilty plea to the
charge and obtain, in advance, a date for trial by personally contact-
ing the calendar clerk. In cases where such procedure does not
result in the assignment of a date acceptable to all parties concerned,
the matter will be referred to the Calendar Division judge who will,
after consultation with defendant and/or his attorney, city attorney,
court liaison officer and calendar clerk, select an appropriate trial
date. Trial settings of cases under pleas of not guilty will be sched-
uled at staggered times instead of setting all such cases at the same
time as was accepted practice under the former system. This is de-
signed to save time, in court, of attorneys, police officers, witnesses
and others interested in particular cases and experiences thus far
indicate pleasing results in that direction.
Septembe:-October, 1957
Each attorney having matters for arraignment and/or trial
setting is requested to enter his appearance with the Calendar
Division clerk as soon as possible in order that he or she may be
contacted thereafter, should any development occur requiring con-
sultation in a particular case. This should be done by setting forth
the name of the attorney, in print, on the original complaint in the
appropriate box provided for that purpose.
Requests for postponement in the trial date as originally set
by the calendar clerk will be granted only upon a showing of good
and sufficient cause and, excepting cases of real emergency, must
be made at least 48 hours prior to the date and time set for trial in
order to permit the re-notification of witnesses. Any request for post-
ponement made less than 48 hours prior to the trial date must be
referred to the office of the City Attorney, Traffic Division, at the
West Side Court Building, for recommendation.
Regardless of whether the plea in the Calendar Division is
"guilty" or "not guilty," if the defendant disagrees with the judg-
ment of the Municipal Court, he or she may appeal to the Denver
Superior Court. This has been the consistent and accepted practice
in Denver for many years past.
In conclusion, may I say those of us in City Government who
have primary responsibility in the premises believe this new pro-
gram constitutes a distinct improvement over the old arbitrary
system in providing as it does, an equitable and fair system of traffic
law enforcement and Municipal Court procedures. It is, we feel, fair
to the alleged violator, fair to the Police Department, as the enforc-
ing agency, and fair to members of this community.
However, it does constitute a revolutionary change so far as
Denver is concerned and it is extremely important, therefore, that
particular groups and individuals affected, including specifically
members of the Bar as well as citizens generally, understand the
basic points involved in order that the program can be intelligently
evaluated and thus justified, accepted and supported by the com-
munity.
The writer, therefore, extends an invitation to the readers of
DICTA to forward any and all suggestions which might serve to
clarify or improve this new procedure-which suggestions, if re-
ceived, will be more than welcome and be given prompt attention.
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THE LABYRINTH OF ROYALTY AND MINERAL
INTERESTS - A SURVEY
By FRED A. DEERING, JR.
This is the second installment of an article which began in the last issue, 34 DICTA 195 (1957).
OKLAHOMA
Unlike Texas, Oklahoma has fairly consistently adhered to the
"non-ownership" concept, having rejected the doctrine of absolute
ownership of minerals in place.1 Notwithstanding, severed mineral
and royalty rights are considered to be interests in real property or
in land.' As early as 1923 the severance of a pure royalty interest
(as opposed to an expense-bearing mineral fee interest) was recog-
nized.3 Since the opening of this Pandora's box, the Oklahoma court
has almost constantly wrestled with the mineral-royalty distinction
and the attendant correlative problems.4 A synthesis of the numer-
ous decisions is almost impossible to achieve, but a few general
principles can be adduced.
The Oklahoma courts seem to be committed to the doctrine
that the word "royalty" may mean either one of two things. In the
"broad" sense the word connotes an interest in the mineral fee, the
holder having the right of ingress and egress to remove his propor-
' McKernan v. Josey Oil Co., 106 Okla. 100, 233 Pac. 451 (1925); Wright v. Carter Oil Co., 97
Oka. 46, 223 P.2d 835 (1923); Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 64 Okla., 249, 167 Pac. 468
(1917). But cf. Hudson v. Smith, 171 Okla. 79, 41 P.2d 861 (1935) and Wilson v. Cox, 100 Okla.
300, 229 Pac. 267 (1924), where the court described a reserved mineral estate as a "fee interest in
the grantor." Bowen, Pitfalls in Mineral Conveyancing in Oklahoma, 9 Okla. L. Rev. 133 (1956) is a
valuable treatise tracing the development of the severed mineral interest in Oklahoma and delineating
many of the problems which have arisen.
2Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Ball, 203 Okla. 514, 223 P.2d 136 (1950); Ross v. District Court, 199
Okla. 573, 188 P.2d 861 (1948); Sunray Oil Co. v. Corte. Oil Co., 188 Okla. 690, 112 P.2d 792
(1941); Melton v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 109 P.2d 509 (1940); Meyers v. Central Bank, 183 Okla. 231,
80 P.2d 584 (1938).
3 Dunlop v. Jackson, 92 Okla. 246, 219 Poc. 314 (1923), holding valid a reservation of 3/4 "of the
royalties of all oil or gas or the proceeds therefrom which may be produced." And see Meyers v.
Hines, 149 Okla. 232, 300 Pac. 309 (1931), construing a reservation of an undivided 1/a interest in
and to all oil and gas produced (the deed reciting an existing lease) as creating a perpetual non-
participating royalty.
4 Davis v. Mann, 234 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1956); Plymell v. Lee, 139 F. Supp. 739 (W.D. Okla.
1956); Mabee Oil & Gas Co. v. Hudson, 156 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1946); Shinn v. Buxton, 154 F.2d 629
(10th Cir. 1946); Crews v. Burke, Case #37331 p.
3 24
, Okla. B.A.J. for Mar. 9, 1957; Cook v. Mc-
Clellan, 311 P.2d 244 (Okla. 1957); Coker v. Hudspeth, 308 P.2d 291 (Okla. 1957); Lawson v. Earp,
309 P.2d 721 (Okla. 1956); Keener v. Neustadt, 304 P.2d 303 (Okla. 1956); Doss Oil Royalty Co. v.
Lahman, 302 P.2d 157, (Okla. 1956); McNeil v. Show, 295 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1956); Hortness v. Young,
299 P.2d 699 (Okla. 1956); Malay v. Smith, 5 Oil and Gas Rep. 564 (Okla. 1956); Colonial Royalties
Co. v. Keener, 266 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1954); Surety Royalty Co. v. Sullivan, 275 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1954);
Casteel v. Crigler, 266 P.2d 643 (Okla. 1953); Ewing v. Trawick, 208 Okla. 311, 256 P.2d 182 (1953);
Iskian v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 251 P.2d 1073 (Okl. 1952); Federal Land Bank v. Nichol-
son, 207 Okla. 512, 251 P.2d 490 (1952); Meeks v. Harmon, 207 Okla. 459, 250 P.2d 203 (1952);
Pease v. Dolezal, 206 Okla. 696, 246 P.2d 757 (1952); Elliott v. Berry, 206 Okla. 594, 245 P.2d 726
(1952); Fry v. Smith, 205 Okla. 222, 236 P.2d 699 (1951); Conner v. Frickenschmidt, 205 Okla. 230,
236 P.2d 674 (1951); Armstrong v. McCracken, 204 Okla. 319, 229 P.2d 590 (1951); Purcell v. Thaxton,
202 Okla. 612, 216 P.2d 574 (1950); Hinkle v. Gauntt, 201 Okla. 432, 206 P.2d 1001 (1949); Gardner
v. Jones, 198 Okla. 691, 181 P.2d 838 (1947); Swearingen v. Oldham, 195 Okla. 532, 159 P.2d 247
(1945); McCullough v. Almach, 188 Okla. 434, 110 P.2d 295 (1941); Melton v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388,
109 P.2d 509 (1940); McCullough v. Burks, 185 Okla. 1502, 94 P.2d 541 (1939); Manley v. Boling, 186
Okla. 59, 96 P.2d 30 (1939); Sykes v. Austin. 182 Okla. 299, 77 P.2d 719 (1938); Meyers v. Central
Nat'l Bank, 183 Okla. 231, 80 P.2d 584 (1937); Carroll v. Bowen, 180 Oka. 215, 68 P.2d 773 (1937);
Douglas v. Douglas, 176 Okla. 378, 56 P.2d 362 (1936); Burns v. Bastien, 174 Okla. 40, 50 P.2d 377
(1935); Wilson v. Olsen, 167 Okla. 527, 30 P.2d 710 (1934); Sullivan v. Sykes, 114 Okla. 87, 243
Pac. 723 (1926); Humphrey v. Taylor, 106 Okla. 38, 233 Pac. 180 (1925). For interesting discussions
of some of these cases see Bowen, Pitfalls in Mineral Conveyancing in Oklahoma, 9 Okla. L. Rev.
133 (1956); Dunlop, The Impact of Burns v. Bastien, 21 Okla. B.A.J. 115 (1950); Mason, Mineral
Rights or Royalties, 18 Okla. B.A.J. 1739 (1947); Morris, Some Legal Consequences Resulting from a
Separation of the Incidents of Ownership of a Mnerol Interest, 7 Okla. L. Rev. 285 (1954).
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tionate share of the minerals, the right to join in any oil and gas
lease, and the right to demand and receive his proportionate share
of the bonus, rents and royalties under such lease. In the "strict"
sense, the term "royalty" denotes only the right in the oil and gas
produced, nonparticipating in rentals and bonuses, and not including
the executive right to lease or the privilege of ingress and egress.5
The latter connotation has been referred to by the Oklahoma courts
as the "popular" meaning of the word "royalty."6 In addition to this
theory, or possibly as its rational correlative, the Oklahoma courts
have also adopted the principle that the word "royalty" standing
alone is ambiguous, at least when used in a conveyance or reser-
vation which does not specify the percentage or fraction of total
production which is the royalty share and where no reference is
made to an existing lease establishing this amount.7 For example,
conveyances or reservations of "3/4 of the oil and gas royalty" have
been held sufficiently ambiguous to permit the introduction of parol
testimony and extrinsic evidence for clarification.8 Generally speak-
ing, in the words of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, "the term 'roy-
alty' is construed in the broad sense of denoting mineral rights when
there is no oil or gas lease upon the property, but is construed in
the restricted sense of denoting an interest in the production when
the property is under lease for oil and gas."9 Where a deed specifies
the royalty share and then conveys or reserves a fractional part
thereof, the Oklahoma courts have ordinarily construed such an
instrument as unambiguously creating a nonparticipating royalty
interest. Illustrative of this principle is Carroll v. Bowen,' ° where
a reservation of the undivided interest "in and to the Royalty (the
ordinary 1/8 ordinarily left the grantor in oil and gas leases being
the royalty above referred to)" was construed As vesting a 1/16 per-
petual nonparticipating royalty interest.
At least two Oklahoma cases establish the generally recognized
principle that the reservation of 1/16 (or any other fraction) of all
oil, gas or other minerals in or under the land involved creates only
a mineral fee interest not to be enlarged to permit the holder to
5 Mabee Oil & Gas Co. v. Hudson, 156 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1946); Elliott v. Berry, 206 Okla. 594,
245 P.2d 726 (1952); Purcell v. Thaxton, 202 Okla. 612, 216 P.2d 574 (1950); Melton v. Sneed, 188
Okla. 388, 109 P.2d 509 (1940); Carroll v. Bowen, 180 Okla. 215, 68 P.2d 773 (1937). But cf. Federal
Land Bank v. Nicholson, 207 Okla. 512, 251 P.2d 490 (1952), where the court made the amazing
statement that "In this state, the term 'royalty' has never been construed to mean an interest in oil,
gas, or other minerals 'in place.' but accrues only after production has been obtained," and con-
strued a reservation of an undivided 1/2 interest in all oil and gas royalties reserved under any
existing or future lease with the grantee having the right to all lease rentals as creating only a non-
perpetual royalty, even though no lease was in existence at the time the deed was executed.
6 Carroll v. Bowen, supra note 5.
Ibid.; Pauly v. Pauly, 198 Okla. 156, 176 P.2d 491 (1946); Melton v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 109
P.2d 509 (1940); Burns v. Bastien, 174 Okla. 40, 50 P.2d 377 (1935); Wilson v. Olsen, 167 Okla. 527,
30 P.2d 710 (1934).
8 Burns v. Bastien, and Wilson v. Olsen, supro note 7. Decisions in Federal Land Bank v. Nichol-
son, 207 Okla. 512, 251 P.2d 490 (1952) and Meeks v. Harmon, 207 Okla. 459, 250 P.2d 403 (1952)
may indicate a trend away from this principle.
Elliott v. Berry, 206 Okla. 594, 596, 245 P.2d 726, 729 (1952); Melton v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388,
109 P.2d 509 (1940) construing a conveyance of "one-third of all royalties, from oil, gas, or other
minerals arising from or out of or produced" as creating a mineral fee estate, where no oil and gas
lease in existence. But cf. Meyers v. Central Nat'l Bank, 183 Okla. 231, 80 P.2d 584 (1937), holding
that a grant of "an undivided one-half interest in and to the oil and gas royalty rights" conveyed
a mineral fee estate even though a lease was in existence when the deed was executed. Meeks v.
Harmon, 207 Okla. 459, 250 P.2d 403 (1952), where the court construed a reservation of 2/3 of all
"royalties, rights and interests" under an existing oil and gas lease, as creating a non-participating
royalty interest only would seem to be good law, but contrary to the Meyers decision, which the-
court attempted to distinguish on the grounds that the Meyers deed did not specifically mention the
outstanding lease.
10 180 Okla. 215. 68 P.2d 773 (1937). And see Sykes v. Austin, 182 Okla. 299, 77 .P.2d 719 (1938)
and Douglas v. Douglas, 176 Okla. 378, 56 P.2d 362 (1936).
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receive a full 1/16 of the oil and gas produced, even though the
executive right to lease and to participate in rentals and bonuses
is expressly not retained.1 On the other hand, several cases assert
the proposition that a conveyance of 1/16 of the oil and gas in and
under certain land, when followed by language disclosing that the
parties intended the grantee to receive a full 1/16 of the oil and gas
after production, creates a perpetual 1/16 royalty interest. 12 The
common practice of adding the words "and which may be produced"
after the phrase "in and under" in a deed which grants or reserves
a fractional interest in the oil and gas does not convert a mineral
fee estate into a royalty interest. 1 A reservation of 1/16 "of all oil
and gas produced" when coupled with a reservation of the right
of ingress and egress for the purpose of drilling has been held to
Swearingen v. Oldham, 195 Okla. 532, 159 P.2d 247 (1945); Manley v. Baling, 186 Okla. 59,
96 P.2d 30 (1939); see also Crews v. Burke, Case #37331, 28 Okla. B.A.J. 325 (Okla. 1957) and
Coker v. Hudspeth, 308 P.2d 291 (Okla. 1957).
12 Fry v. Smith, 205 Okla. 222, 236 P.2d 699 (1951); Gardner v. Jones, 198 Okla. 691, 181 P.2d
838 (1947); and see Armstrong v. McCracken, 204 Okla. 319, 229 P.2d 590 (1951), where a reservation
of 1/16 of the oil and gas produced was held to create a 1/16 royalty interest under which the
holder was entitled to a full 1/16 of the gross production. In Casteel v. Crigler, 266 P.2d 643 (Okla.
1953), the court construed a reservation of 3/32 "in oil crude oil that may hereafter be produced" as
a nonparticipating royalty. Lawson v. Earp, 309 P.2d 721 (Okla. 1957) holds that a reservation of
"an undivided /a interest in and to all the oil, gas, and other minerals that may be produced," with
the grantee having the exclusive leasing power and the right to receive all bonus and rentals, created
a nonparticipating royalty interest, entitling the holder to a net 1/8 of all production.
" Manley v. Baling, 186 Okla. 59, 96 P.2d 30 (1939) holding that a. grant of "an utdivided
one-sixteenth (1/16) of all the oil, gas and other minerals in and under . . . and which may be found
therein, or produced therefrom . . ." together with the right of ingress and egress to enter the lands
and remove the same, conveyed only a 1/16 mineral fee estate, entitling the holder to 1/16 of the T/s
royalty. Designation of the instrument as a "royalty contract" was pronounced not controlling. See
also, Hinkle v. Gauntt, 201 Okla. 432, 206 P.2d 1001 (1949) reaching the same restult under a deed
reserving a 1/16 interest "in the oil and gas deposits that may be developed in said land," together
with 1/2 of the bonus or rental under an existinq lease.
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create a 1/16 mineral fee estate, limiting the participation of the




A recent decision holds that a conveyance of "the unconditional
right and privilege to receive all royalty of oil and gas that is mined,
produced and saved" under an existing or any future oil and gas
lease, is tantamount to a conveyance of 1001% of the fee title to the
oil and gas in place."5 Another late case 6 reconfirms the rule of
Burns v. Bastien1 in holding that the reservation of "an equal 1/16
royalty in all oil, gas or mineral rights" where no oil and gas lease
was outstanding at the time of conveyance, must be construed in
the "broad"sense as creating a 1/16 interest in the oil and gas in
fee, limiting the holder's participation in production to 1/16 of any
royalty provided for in future leases. An opposite conclusion was
reached in Doss Oil Royalty Company v. Lahman,'8 where the court
construed the words "3/64 royalty interest in and to the oil and gas"
as conveying a nonparticipating royalty interest entitling the holder
to 3/64 of the net production, apparently because of the existence
of an oil and gas lease at the time of the conveyance.
The confusion presently extant in Oklahoma concerning the
mineral-royalty distinction arises in large part because of the judi-
cial approach exemplified in the following quotation from a recent
decision:
"It will be observed that the cited cases deal with reser-
vations in conveyances and conveyances of minerals not
encumbered by existing oil and gas leases. These decisions
and others that might be noted, classically illustrate our
pronouncements that every case must be approached for a
concrete solution upon its individual facts. Absence of fraud
or mutual mistake and no claim of ambiguity made, we
must look to the four corners of the instrument and from
it alone weigh the quantity and quality of the convey-
ance.,"19
14 Pease v. Dolezal, 206 Okla. 594, 246 P.2d 757 (1952) (no lease in existence at time of convey-
ance). In Malay v. Smith, 5 Oil and Gas Rep. 565 (1956) it was held that a reservation of an un-
divided 1/2 interest in and to 1/8 "of the total production which may be produced" created a 1/16
perpetual royalty interest where the deed expressly granted, and did not reserve, the executive leasing
power and the right to participate in bonus and rentals. By dictum the court indicated that the
reservation of 1/2 of 1/ of the total oil and gas production standing alone "might be properly con-
strued as a reservation to an interest in the minerals in place." See also Surety Royalty Company v.
Sullivan, 275 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1954), construing a conveyance of 1/16 of the gas and oil rights when
coupled with the express grant of ingress and egress and the right to participate in rentals and
bonuses as conveying a 1/16 mineral fee estate. McNeill v. Show, 295 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1956) holds
that an instrument entitled "sale of all and gas royalty" which conveyed a 1/32 interest in the oil
and gas in and under certain described land, with a provision that the grantee should be entitled
to 1/32 of all rents and royalites under an existing lease in the same manner as if the grantee had
been the owner in fee of a 1/32 interest in the lands at the time of execution of the lease, conveyed
only a 1/32 mineral fee estate, entitling the grantee to 1/32 of the 1/8 royalty and not to 1/32 of the
net production.
's Hartness v. Young, 299 P.2d 699 (Okla. 1956). Designation of the instrument in question as
"Conveyance of Oil and Gas Royalty" was held not determinative of the nature of the interest
conveyed.
1" Cook v. McClellan, 6 Oil and Gas Rep. 638 (Okla. 1956), opinion -superseded on petition for
rehearing, 311 P.2d 244 (Okla. 1957). The first decision is an excellent example of the judicial con-
fusion which plagues the title examiner attempting to distinguish mineral from royalty interests. As
the commentator in 7 Oil and Gas Rep. 87 points out, the opinion in the first decision "gave the
reader the feeling that the court had signaled for a left-hand turn and then turned to the right.'
"7 174 Okla. 40, 50 P.2d 377 (1955).
302 P.2d 157 (Okla. 1956).




Although several earlier decisions of the California Court of
Appeals had touched upon the problem,0 it was not until 1935 in
Callahan v. Martin21 that the California Supreme Court expressly
recognized the right of a landowner to sever and convey a portion
of his royalty interest in oil and gas, the court holding that an
assignee of a royalty interest in oil rights under an assignment by
the landowner "has an interest or estate in real property in the
nature of an incorporeal hereditament." An unfortunate dictum
in the same decision, however, immediately confused the issue.
While characterizing a conveyance of 3% of all oil, gas and other
hydrocarbon substances produced, extracted and saved as a "royalty
interest," presumably entitling the holder to 3 % of the gross pro-
duction, the court inconsistently declared that the royalty owner
became a tenant in common with his assignor, and was privileged
to enter upon the land and drill for and produce his share of the
oil. The confusion persisted in later California decisions, notably
Dabney - Johnson Oil Corp. v. Walden,22  Barnard v. Jami-
son,23 and the first decision in Little v. Mountain View Dairies.
2 4
The failure to recognize the basic distinction between the expense-
free, nonparticipating royalty interest which does not entitle the
holder to produce the oil and gas or execute leases granting that
privilege to others, and ownership in a fractional interest in the oil
and gas in fee carrying with it all of the attributes of the mineral
o Dobney-Johnson Oil Corp. v. Hitchcock, 25 P.2d 867 (Cal. App. 1933); Beam v. Dugan, 132 Cal.
App. 546, 23 P.2d 58 (1933); Clark v. Richfield Oil Co., 127 Col. App. 495, 16 P.2d 162 (1932); Jones
v. Pier, 124 Cal. App. 444, 12 P.2d 646 (1932); Merrill v. California Petroleum Corp., 105 Cal. App.
737, 288 Pac. 721 (1930).
"3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935). The case also places California among the "qualified
ownership" jurisdictions. For other California decisions characterizing a royalty interest as a profit
a prendre, and an incorporeal hereditament, see Standard Oil Co. v. John P. Mills Organization, 43 P.2d
797 (Calif. 1935); Dabney v. Edwards, 5 Cal. 2d 1, 53 P.2d 962 (1935); Scheel v. Harr, 27 Cal. App.
2d 345, 80 P.2d 1035 (1935); Morrow v. Coast Land Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 92, 84 P.2d 301 (1938);
Lever v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 2d 667, 87 P.2d 66 (1939); Pementel v. Hall-Baker Co., 32 Cal. App. 2d.
697, 90 P.2d 588 (1939); Sandrini c. Branch, 32 Cal. App. 2d 707, 90 P.2d 593 (1939); Andrews v.
W.K Company, 94 P.2d 604, (Cal. App. 1939); Macklin v. Brittain, 37 Cal. 2d 120, 98 P.2d 744 (1940).
Oil royalty has also been described as the equivalent of "rent," i.e., the compensation which the
occupier of land pays for the privilege of occupation and use, Denia .. City of Huntington Beach, 22
Cal. 2d 580, 140 P.2d 392 (1943).
224 Cal. 2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935).
"78 Cal. App. 2d 136, 177 P.2d 341 (1947).
" 208 P.2d 361 (Calif. 1949). See also LaLaguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, 18 Cal. 2d 132, 114 P.2d
351 (1941).
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estate, continued to confound the California courts until 1950, when
the second decision in Little v. Mountain View Dairies5 was ren-
dered. This decision is unequivocally committed to the view that
a conveyance of "8-1/3o of all oil, gas and other hydrocarbon sub-
stances, and minerals, in, under and/or which may be hereafter
produced and saved" creates a mineral fee estate, entitling the
holder to receive only 8-1/3 % of the royalty oil and gas, and not
8-1/3% of the total production as the court had held in the first
Little case. Although one later decision apparently fails to recog-
nize the fundamental revision of approach which has occurred in
California,2 6 a case in late 1954 reiterates the principle enunciated
in the Little opinion."7 As yet, there are no California cases dealing
directly with the pure royalty interest and recognizing its existence
as a distinct type of property right permitting the holder to share
in production without creating a tenancy in common in the mineral
fee estate.
KANSAS
Two decisions, Miller v. Sooy 28 and Lathrop v. Eyestone,29 have
cast a pall over the perpetual royalty interest in Kansas, which
the courts have not yet had the opportunity or the inclination to
dispel. The Miller case construed an instrument conveying an un-
divided interest in all royalties, rents, bonuses and other consid-
erations to accrue by virtue of any oil and gas lease then in exis-
tence, or which might thereafter be executed, as being valid against
a contention that the transfer violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.
In holding that the conveyance did not run afoul of the Rule, how-
ever, the court placed its decision on the ground that the obligation
created by the assignment did not pass with the land and continue
indefinitely inasmuch as the instrument did not by its terms bind
the assignors' successors and assigns. The court concluded that the
royalty interest in question related only to production under leases
executed by the assignors, and not to those which might be executed
by subsequent landowners. The clear implication of the decision
was that perpetual royalty conveyances where the grantee is given
the right to participate in production under any future lease no
35 Cal. 2d 232, 217 P.2d 416 (1950), reversing on rehearing, Little v. Mountain View Dairies,
supra note 24.
m Paddock v. Vasquez, 122 Cal. App. 2d, 265 P.2d 121 (1954), commented on in 32 Texas L. Rev.
766 (1954), where the' court found no inconsistency between a granting clause conveying "3% of
100% of all petroleum, oil, gas and other hydrocarbons within or underlying, or which may be pro-
duced" from property, and a "subject-to" clause providing that the grantee should be entitled to
6/25ths of all bonuses, rents and royalties to accrue under the existing or any future leases. The
court relied heavily on the "double-grant" theory prevalent in Texas and enunciated in such decisions
as Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945) and Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925).
- Robinson v. Southwestern Development Co., 275 P.2d 825 (Calif. 1954). For a discussion of
some of the California cases, and the judicial mutation which has occurred, see Maxwell, A Primer
of Mineral and Royalty Conveyancing, 3 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 449 (1956). A treatise dealing with the
earlier decisions is Levy, "Oil Royalties-A Distinct Species of Property," 11 So. Calif. L. Rev. 319
(1938).
" 120 Kan. 81, 242 Pac. 140 (1926).
- 170 Kan. 419, 227 P.2d 136 (1951).
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matter by whom executed, would violate the Rule Against Perpet-
uities.
Oddly enough, the question was not again raised until the
Lathrop case in 1951, in which the Kansas Supreme Court in a
much criticized decision held that a perpetual royalty interest
violates the Rule Against Perpetuities. Unfortunately, the opinion is
not characterized by lucidity of logic or expression. One glaring
inconsistency is the application of the Rule, which is traditionally
applied only to interests in land, to a royalty interest which the
court then characterized as personal property.
Although a perpetual royalty interest cannot be safely created
in Kansas until the Lathrop decision is expressly overruled, later
cases have made substantial inroads on its enunciated principle. A
1952 decision held that a pooling provision contained in an oil and
gas lease is not violative of the Rule, 30 and a 1954 case declares that
an assignment of overriding royalty under an existing lease "or
any extension or renewal thereof" is valid.8 1 Illustrative of the
quandry in which the Kansas Supreme Court now finds itself, how-
ever, is Froelich v. United Royalty Company,31 where the court in
order to avoid application of the Rule Against Perpetuities con-
strued a conveyance of a interest "in an to the oil and gas royalty,
which is or may hereafter be reserved.., exclusive of the oil and
gas bonus and oil and gas rental money..." as vesting a interest
in the minerals in place, even though the grantor expressly reserved
the right to execute oil and gas leases without participation by the
grantee.
Prior to the Lathrop decision, a number of Kansas cases recog-
nized the fundamental differences between a nonparticipating
royalty interest and ownership of the oil and gas in place, construing
various instruments as creating perpetual or term royalty inter-
ests. 3  Most of the decisions define a royalty interest as personal
rather than real property, and no mention is made of the Rule
Against Perpetuities.'4
Another line of Kansas decisions adopts sound judicial reason-
ing in construing conveyances of fractional interests in the oil and
o Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 Kan. 183, 245 P.2d 176 (1952).
" Howell v. Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 176 Kan. 572, 271 P.2d 271 (1954).
'a 178 Kan. 503, 290 P.2d 93 (1955), on rehearing, 297 P.2d 1106 (Kan. 1956). See also Tegarden v.
Beers, 175 Kan. 610, 265 P.2d 845 (1954). For discussions of the Rule Against Perpetuities and the
perpetual royalty interest, see Kuntz, Rule Against Perpetuities and Mineral Interest, 8 Okla. L. Rev.
183 (1955); Meyers, Effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities on Perpetual Non-Participating Royalty and
Kindred Interests, 32 Texas L. Rev. 369 (1954); Note, 21 Kan. B.A.J. 95 (1952); Note, 15 So. Calif. L.
Rev. 119 (1941). The Froelich decision might have been distinguished from the Lathrop case on the
grounds that the grant in Froelich was limited to 21 years and as long thereafter as oil or gas was
produced, but the court did not utilize this approach. For a brief treatment of this possible rationale,
see Discussion Note, 5 Oil and Gas Rep. 326, 328.
X Leydig Y. Commissioner, 43 F. 2d 494 (10th Cir. 1930); Riffel v. Dieter, 159 Kan. 628, 157 P.2d
831 (1945) (12 years and as long thereafter as oil or gas produced); Hickey v. Dirks, 156 Kan. 326,
133 P.2d 107 (1943) conveyance limited to 10 years and as long thereafter as production in paying
quantities; Davis v. Hurst, 150 Kan. 130, 90 P.2d 1100 (1939) where the court construed a reservation
of 1/2 "of the oil and gas royalties" as creating a pure royalty interest, not entitling the holder to
share in rentals or bonus paid under a lease; Anderson v. Allen, 129 Kan. 502, 283 Pac. 509 (1929);
Bellport v. Harrison, 123 Kan. 310, 255 Pac. 52 (1927); Robinson v. Jones, 119 Kan. 609, 240 Pac. 957
(1925), where "royalty" is defined as "the compensation provided in oil and gas leases for the
privilege of drilling for oil and gas, [consisting] of a share in the oil and gas produced under exist-
ing leases (but not being] a perpetual interest in the oil or gas as they lie in the ground." The case
recognizes that a conveyance of 1/2 of the oil and gas in and under certain lands with a right of
ingress and egress and the privilege of sharing in rentals and bonuses constitutes a grant of the oil
and gas in place and does not convey a mere royalty interest.
:" But compare In re Randolph's Estate, 266 P.2d 315 (Kan. 1954).
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gas in and under and which may be produced from specified lands
as creating fee mineral estates in the oil and gas in place, even
though the instruments involved were labeled "Sale of Oil and Gas
Royalty."3 These decisions have not been repudiated, but the case
of Skelly Oil Co. v. Cities Service Oil Co.,36 should be noted. There
the court construed a conveyance entitled "Sale of Oil and Gas
Royalty" as creating a pure royalty interest as opposed to owner-
ship in the oil and gas in place, although the granting clause con-
veyed a interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals
in and under and that might be produced from certain described
lands, with the grantee having the right of ingress and egress for
development. The basis for the decision appears to be the fact that
the instrument expressly excluded the grantee from participation
in money rentals under the existing lease, and rentals and bonuses
from future leases. The court discounted the grant of ingress and
egress on the basis that since the lands were then under lease, only
the lessee could exercise such right. Finally, in partial contradiction
of earlier decisions holding that the title of the instrument was
immaterial in its construction, the court indicated that while the
label is not "altogether controlling," the content of the document
must make it clear that it is something other than what its title
indicates.
MONTANA
Two well-reasoned Montana decisions clearly establish that a
conveyance or reservation of a fractional interest in all of the "oil
and gas produced and saved," creates an expense-free royalty inter-
est, to be distinguished from fee simple ownership of the oil and gas
in place.3 1 On the other hand, a reservation of 12 % "interest and
royalty in and to all oil and gas and other minerals of whatsoever
nature, found in or located upon or under said land or premises...
or that may be produced therefrom,"" has been construed as an in-
terest in the oil and gas in place. Krutzfeld v. Stevenson 9 is another
example of the confused conveyancer. The case involved a deed
which first granted an undivided 5 % interest in and to all of the oil,
"Fry v. Dewees, 151 Kan. 488, 99 P.2d 844 (1940); Hushow v. Kansas Farmers' Union Royalty Co.,
149 Kan. 64, 86 P.2d 559 (1939); Sledd v. Munsell, 149 Kan. 110, 86 P.2d 567 (1939); Serena v. Rubin,
146 Kan. 603, 72 P.2d 995 (1937); Shaffer v. Kansas Former's Union Royalty Co., 146 Kan. 84, 69
P2d 4 (1937), appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 623 (1938); Richards v. Shearer, 145 Kan. 88, 64 P.2d 56
(1937). Of interest also is Carlock v. Krug, 151 Kon. 407, 99 P.2d 858, 860 (1940), where the court in
establishing the "non-apportionment" rule, notes in passing that a conveyance of a 1/32 interest in
the oil and gas in place was inconsistent with a recitation in the deed that the grantee should receive1/4 of the /e royalty under any future leases, stating that "ownership of a 1/32 interest in the oil
in place is not equivalent to a 1/32 interest in the oil produced under a lease.
m 160 Kan. 226, 160 P.2d 246 (1945).
m Mitchell v. Hanna, 123 Mont. 152, 208 P.2d 812 (1949) (applying the doctrine of after-acquired
title to a royalty assignment, with covenants of warranty); and Rist v. Toole County, 117 Mont. 426,
159 P.2d 340 (1945) (holding a pre-existing royalty interest, as opposed to a mineral-fee estate,
terminated by a tax sale, even though taxes were assessed to the fee simple owner alone). See also
Carroll v. Funk, 222 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1955).
"Marias River Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co., 98 Mont. 254 38 P.2d 599 (1934), the court seizing
on the words " in or located upon or under" and noting the absence of an express provision denoting
the interest as expense-free.
I Krutzfeld v. Stevenson, 86 Mont. 463, 284 Pac. 553 (1930), overruling Hochsprung v. Stevenson,
82 Mont. 222, 266 Pac. 406 (1928) (where in construing an almost identical instrument tho court con-
cluded that the granting clause controlled and the mineral est,,te of the grantee was limited to the
fractional interest therein expressed). In accord with the Krutzfeld decision is Broderick v. Stevenson
Consolidated Oil Co., 88 Mont. 34, 290 Pac. 244 (1930). For discussions of these and other Montana
decisions, see Moulton, Problems and Pitfalls Arising From Mineral and Royalty Conveyances, Proceed-
ings, Mineral Law Section A.B.A. 258, 264 (1956) and Summers, Transfers of Oil and Gas Rents and
Royalties, 10 Texas L. Rev. 1, 14 (1931).
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gas and other minerals in and under and that might be produced
from certain lands, and then provided that the grantee should be
entitled to 2/5 of the rental and royalty under an existing lease,
with a recitation that upon termination of such lease the minerals
should be owned 3/5 by the grantor and 2/5 by the grantee. The
court, in effect, construed the instrument as conveying an undivided
2/5 interest in the oil and gas in place.
NEW MEXICO, NORTH DAKOTA AND WYOMING
While the decisions in New Mexico, North Dakota and Wyoming
are few, these states appear to be committed to the orthodox view
that a perpetual royalty interest in oil and gas constituting a right
in real property may be created by grant or reservation. A recent
New Mexico decision4 0 construes a reservation of " of the %
royalty interest" as vesting title to an interest in real property con-
sisting of a perpetual 1/16 royalty in all oil and gas produced and
saved. Corbett v. LaBere4' in North Dakota, and Denver Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Dickson4 2 in Wyoming, acknowledge the distinction
between ownership of oil and gas in place and a perpetual nonpar-




Unlike Kansas, the Arkansas courts have defined perpetual
nonparticipating royalty interests as real estate,4 3 and one decision
has expressly held that a conveyance of pure royalty does not
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.44 The Oklahoma view that the
word "royalty" standing alone is ambiguous, susceptible of inter-
pretation as synonymous with "minerals," has been rejected in a
40 Duvall v. Stone, 54 N.M. 27, 213 P.2d 212 (1949), expressly disapproving the Kansas view that
a royalty interest is personal property. Other New Mexico decisions not precisely relevant to this
discussion are New Mexico and Arizona Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.M. 1956) construing
a reservation of "oil, gas and other minerals," as including uranium and thorium; and Schroder v.
Gypsy Oil Co., 38 N.M. 124, 28 P.2d 885 (1933) determining the effect of an "entireties" clause in
an oil and gas lease.
168 N.W. 2d 211 (N.D. 1955) "1% Royalty of all the oil and of all the gas produced and saved."
42 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 842 (1942), "one-sixteenth part of all minerals and oils produced and
saved" is a royalty interest. For reference to other Wyoming cases dealing with mineral transfers,
see Note, 1 Wyo. L.J. 93 (1946).
'
5
Clampitt v. Ponder, 91 F. Suop. 535 (W.D. Ark. 1950); Arrington v. United Royalty Co., 188 Ark.
270, 65 S.W.2d 36 (1933); Allen v. Thompson, 169 Ark. 169, 273 S.W. 396 (1925).
". Hanson v. Wore, 274 S.W.2d 339 (Ark. 1955) (1/16 of all "oil and gas produced and saved" is
o royalty interest).
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case declaring that "the ordinary and legal meaning of the term
[royalty] is a share of the product or profit, to be paid to the
grantor or lessor by those who are allowed to develop the prop-
erty."45
There are several cases limiting a royalty conveyance to pro-
duction secured under an outstanding lease recited in the deed, the
intention to so restrict the royalty right being derived from the
language of the instruments in question." A reservation of "
royalty of all oil, gas and other minerals on the above described
land" has been construed as creating a perpetual nonparticipating
royalty interest, giving the holder the right to of any royalty
paid under existing or future leases.4 7 A recent decision involving
the construction of an extremely ambiguous conveyance, holds that
a grant of "all full royalty interest in and 'to all of the oil, gas and
other minerals" transfers a perpetual royalty interest, under which
all of the royalty reserved under oil and gas leases must be delivered
to the grantee, who would have no right, however, to share in bon-
uses or rentals.
48
A troublesome case is O'Neal v. Bank of Parkdale,49 where the
court held that the owner of a reserved 1/16 interest in all oil, gas
and other mineral rights and property for a term of ten years, was
vested only with a right in the oil and gas which might be discover-
ed and reduced to possession, and was not entitled to share in
bonuses and rentals paid under an oil and gas lease. Insofar as the
holding might apply to perpetual mineral interests, it has been
expressly disapproved in a later decision, 0 but the rights of owners
of term mineral interests are still questionable.
LOUISIANA
Litigation in Louisiana concerned with distinguishing royalty
from mineral interests arises principally because of the Civil Code
concept of prescription under which interests in real property are
lost by nonuse for ten years. Both interests in the minerals in place
(referred to in Louisiana judicial parlance as "mineral servitudes")
and naked royalty interests are subject to prescription for nonuser.
Since mineral servitudes carry with them the right of ingress and
egress to produce the severed mineral interest, "user" may be ac-
complished through the drilling of a well by the holder of the min-
eral servitude or his lessee. On the other hand, because the owner of
a royalty interest does not have the right to remove the minerals
45 Longino v. Machen, 217 Ark. 641, 642, 232 S.W.2d 826, 827 (1950), the court also pointing out
"that the ordinary meaning of royalty does not include a perpetual interest in oil and gas in the
ground."
46 Davis v. Collins, 219 Ark. 948, 245 S.W.2d 571 (1952); McWilliams v. Standard Oil Co., 205
Ark. 625, 170 S.W.2d 367 (1943); Keaton v. Murphy, 198 Ark. 799, 131 S.W.2d 625 (1939) (although
there is considerable question as to the correctness of this decision in light of the language contained
in the instrument). Compare Smiley v. Thomas, 220 Ark. 116, 246 S.W.2d 419 (1952) (conveyance of
1/2 of the minerals in place, followed by a clause granting 1/2 the royalty and rental under an existing
lease was held not to terminate on expiration of the lease).
., Clamputt v. Ponder, 91 F. Supp. 535 (W.D. Ark. 1950).
"eArkansas Valley Royalty Co. v. Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Co., 222 Ark. 213, 258 S.W.2d 51
(1953) (a lesson in what to avoid when completing the blanks of a printed form).
'u 180 Ark. 901, 23 S.W.2d 257 (1930).
°Segars v. Goodwin, 196 Ark. 221, 117 S.W.2d 43 (1938). For other cases discussing ownership
of minerals in place, see Citizen's Investment Co. v. Armer, 179 Ark. 376, 16 S.W.2d 15 (1929) (con-
veyance of 1/16 of the oil and gas in place, followed by a recitation that upon termination of the
existing lease the grantee should own 1/2 of the minerals was held to vest 1/2 mineral ownership, at
least subsequent to expiration of the lease); and Rowland v. Griffin, 179 Ark. 421, 16 S.W.2d 457
(1929).
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to which his royalty interest attaches, the drilling of a well without
production will not interrupt the prescriptive period.
Louisiana decisions acknowledging the legal existence and
validity of the severed royalty interest are numerous.5' Only a few
instances, however, has a Louisiana court been called upon to con-
strue a conveyance and determine its operative effect as a transfer
of a mere royalty right or a grant of minerals in place. Apparently
considering the term "royalty," as a word of art, the. Louisiana
Supreme Court has construed a reservation of "1/64 royalty in all
oil, gas and mineral rights" as creating a royalty interest not per-
mitted to participate in the executive leasing right, bonuses or
rentals. 52 As against a contention that a royalty right only was
created, a conveyance of a fractional interest in all of the oil, gas
and other minerals in and under "and that may be produced and
saved" was held to transfer a mineral servitude." Depriving the
51 Spiner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 94 F. Supp. 273 (W.D. La. 1950); Continental Oil Co. v.
Londry, 215 La. 518, 41 So.2d 73 (1949) "royalty defined as the right . . . to share in the production
of oil, gas, and other minerals, if and when they are produced." Although the question was ap-
parently not raised, all parties proceeding on the assumption that a royalty interest had been created
under the deed, this conclusion is open to considerable doubt. St. Martin Land .Co.. v. Pinckney, 212
La. 605, 33 So. 2d 169 (1947) (referring to the royalty right as a "passive interest"); Humble Oil &
Ref. Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33 So. 2d 182 (1947) (court in the first opinion held a conveyance
of a future royalty interest under any lease invalid for uncertainty, and then reversed its position on
rehearing); Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632, 26 So. 2d 845 (1947); Bennett v. Robinson, 25
So. 2d 641 (La. App. 1946); Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939) (where a Louisiana court
first recognized a royalty interest in minerals as subject to severance separate and aport from a
mineral lease).
"Gulf Refining Co. v. Goode, 212 La. 502, 32 So. 2d 904 (1947).
"Standard Oil Co. v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 15 So. 2d 65 (1943) (court failed to comment on the
inconsistency between the grant of a 1/64 mineral interest, and a provision in the deed reciting that
the grantee should receive 1/a of the royalty under any lease, although noting that this clause did not
convert the instrument into a royalty transfer). See also Smith v. Anisman, 85 So. 2d 351 (La. App.
1956) for a similar holding.
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grantee of the right to execute oil and gas leases does not alter the
. character of the interest conveyed from a fee mineral interest (or
in Louisiana, a mineral servitude) to a royalty right.5 4
MissIssippi
Mississippi adheres to the doctrine of absolute ownership of the
oil and gas in place, and, like Texas, denominates the interest of an
oil and gas lessee as- a determinable fee estate in the minerals. A
reservation of a fractional interest in and to all oil and gas "that
might hereafter be discovered" has been held to constitute a mineral
fee estate rather than a nonparticipating royalty interest.5 6
A perpetual nonparticipating royalty interest has been denomin-
ated as realty, 7 and is defined in Mississippi as a share of proceeds,
free and clear of all expense. 8 The word "royalty" has assumed
such a definite judicial meaning that one case held a devise of "all
my royalties" insufficient to pass title to fractional mineral interests
owned by the testator." It is doubtful that the testator's purpose
was accomplished, and the wisdom of the decision is open to
question. A reservation of the "profits" from oil or gas discovered
creates a royalty interest rather than a mineral fee estate,6 0 although
the holder's right to participate in bonus and delay rentals has
never been determined. A reservation of "all rentals" under an
existing oil and gas lease does not include the privilege of sharing
in royalties on oil and gas produced.' A reservation of all oil, gas
and other minerals entitles the grantor to execute oil and gas
leases, even though the deed provides that all bonuses and delay
rentals are to be the property of the grantee.6 2 On the other hand,
a conveyance of a fractional interest in and to all of the oil, gas
and other -minerals in and under certain lands was construed to
effectuate a royalty grant only, where the grantor reserved the
exclusive leasing power and the right to receive all bonuses and
delay rentals.63 A recent decision holds that a reference to "royalty
acres" does not alter the construction of a granting clause which
otherwise conveyed a mineral estate in the oil and gas in place.6 4
In many respects, the decisions of the Mississippi Supreme
Court are among the most logical and well reasoned in the mineral-
royalty field, and although the court has sometimes been lampered
Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So 2d 657 (1954). In connection with the right of a
fractional mineral owner to whom the executive leasing power for the full mineral estate has been
granted, to collect 100% of the bonus and rentals, see Ledoux v. Voorhies, 222 La. 200, 62 So. 2d
273 (1952), and Mt. Forest Fur Farms v. Cockrell, 179 La. 795, 155 So. 228 (1934).
• Koenig v. Calcote, 199 Miss. 435, 25 So. 2d 763 (1945).5
McNeese v. Renner, 197 Miss. 203, 21 So. 2d 7 (1945). Cf. Armstrong v. Bell, 199 Miss. 29, 24
So. 2d 10 (1945), where a reservation of "1/32 of all gas, oil or minerals which may hereafter be
found, discovered, mined or produced" with a provision that the holder should receive 1/4 of the 
1
/
royalty under the existing lease, and "1/32 royalty" from future leases, was construed as creating a
1/32 perpetual royalty interest, against a strong dissent.
5' Merrill Engineering Co. v. Capitol Nat'l Bank, 192 Miss. 378, 5 So. 2d 666 (1942).
Palmer v. Crews, 203 Miss. 806, 35 So. 2d 430, 4 A.L.R.2d 483 (1948).
Ibid.
' Hassle Hunt Trust v. Proctor, 215 Miss. 84, 60 So. 2d 551 (1952); Gulf Refining Co. v. Stanford,
202 Miss. 602, 30 So. 2d 516 (1947).
"I Abney v. Lewis, 203 Miss. 105, 56 So. 2d 48 (1952)..Westbrook v. Ball, 77 So. 2d 274 (Miss. 1955).
' Texas Gulf Producing Co. v. Griffith, 65 So. 2d 823 (Miss. 1953).
Ford v. Jones, 85 So. 2d 215 (Miss. 1956).
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by a rigidity of approach,65 the law relating to the creation and
transfer of royalty and mineral interests is reasonably consistent
and predictable in this state.
WEST VIRGINIA
The West Virginia decisions best exemplify the so-called min-
ority rule which adheres to the viewpoint that an attempted grant
or reservation of what in most states would be designated a royalty
interest, creates a mineral fee estate.66 In one early decision, a
majority of the West Virginia Supreme Court was of the opinion
that royalty was not oil in the ground or the title thereto, but a
separate and distinct entity.6 This view was unquestionably dis-
approved, however, in a later case,68 and the theory that a grant or
reservation of royalties, rentals afid income which might arise
from the operation of land for oil and gas purposes is, in fact, a
grant or reservation of such minerals in place, was reasserted.
The deficiencies of the West Virginia rule are well illustrated
in McIntosh v. Vail,69 involving a deed under which the grantor
first reserved all of the oil and gas in place, and then agreed in the
event such substances were found on the lands involved, to "yield
and pay" to the grantee 1/16 of the oil and gas produced and mar-
UsSee, e.g., Anderson v. Butler, 203 Miss. 512, 35 So. 2d 709 (1948), where a conveyance of 1/16
of the oil, gas and other minerals was held to be a 1/16 interest in the minerals in place, despite a
provision that the grantee should receive 1/2 of the grantor's rights under any existing or future lease.
soCollins v. Stalnaker, 131 W. Va. 543, 48 S.E.2d 430 (1948); United Carbon Co. v. Presley, 126
W. Va. 636, 29 S.E.2d 466 (1944)- Robinson v. Milam, 125 W. Va. 218, 24 S.E.2d 236 (1942); Lockhart
v. United Fuel & Gas Co., 105 W. Va. 69, 141 S.E. 521 (1928); Hale v. Grow, 88 W. Va. 173, 106
S.E. 409 (1921); Snodgrass v. Koen, 82 W. Va. 337, 96 S.E. 606 (1918); Paxtum v. Benedum-Trees Co.,
80 W. Va. 187, 94 S.E. 472 (1917); Homer v. Philadelphia Co., 71 W. Va. 345, 76 S.E. 662 (1912)
(refusing to construe a grant of 1/2 royalty as perpetual, but limiting the estate to participation in
royalty under an existing lease); Updegraff v. Coal & Land Co., 74 W. Va. 316, 81 S.E. 1050 (1914)
(reservation of oil and gas royalties reserves the oil and gas in place); Toothman v. Courtney, 62
W. Va. 167, 58 S.E. 915 (1907); Harris v. Cobb, 49 W. Va. 360, 38 S.E. 559 (1901), holding that a
reservation of "one-half part of the usual royalty of one-eighth" reserved both a 1/2 royalty interest
and 1/16 of the oil and gas in place. (This decision, insofar as it holds that the grantee received
1/16, rather than 1/2, of the oil and gas in place is disapproved in the Paxtum decision, cited supra,
this note). But cf. McDonald v. Bennett, 112 W. Va. 347, 164 S.E. 298 (1932), where the court de-
clared a reservation of "1/8 of all the oil and gas in and underlying said tract of land that may be
produced therefrom" as retaining 1/8 of the oil and gas produced, "as contradistinguished from 1/8 of
the oil and gas in place"; and Jackson v. Dulaney, 67 W. Va. 309, 67 S.E. 795 (1910), construing a
reservation of 1/10 of the mineral oil produced to be delivered free of cost as constituting "a royalty
in the oil, possessing the same quality of estate as royalty reserved in the usual oil and gas lease.
a Campbell v. Lynch, 81 W. Va. 374, 94 S.E. 739 (1918).
"Walker v. West Virginia Gas Corp., 121 W. Va. 251, 3 S.E.2d 55 (1939).
' 126 W. Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d 607 (1944). But compare, McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W. Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d
607 (1943), where the court construed a deed reserving all oil and gas with the right of ingress and
earess, but providing that in the event of production the grantee "shall be entitled to one full sixteenth
of all oil marketed and one half of the net proceeds from all gas sold," as conferring an oil and gas
interest in the nature of a "royalty" an the grantee entitling him to 1/2 of the net proceeds of all the
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keted. The court construed the covenant in favor of the grantee
as a mere personal obligation enforceable only against the grantor,
and not attaching to the mineral estate as a covenant running with
the land.
Both the judiciary and the practitioners of West Virginia have
encountered considerable difficulty with the fraction "1/16." 70 Early
decisions seemed to equate 1/16 of the oil and gas in place with ,71
but these cases were later overruled.
7 2
It is interesting to note that the Colorado Supreme Court in
Simson v. Langholf73 cited several West Virginia decisions in sup-
port of its holding that the interest there in question constituted
ownership of the oil and gas in place as opposed to nonparticipating
royalty.
ALABAMA, FLORIDA & KENTUCKY
The Supreme Courts of Alabama and Florida have each handed
down one decision bearing on the mineral-royalty question. In
McCall v. Nettles, I which is strikingly similar to the Simson case
in Colorado, it was held that a reservation of 50% of all rentals
that may be derived from coal, oil, gas or other mineral leases, and
50% of all royalties, whether derived in kind or money, created
"an interest in the minerals themselves as they are imbedded in
the ground before there is an effort to extract them." The opinion
is unsatisfactory in both result and reasoning, particularly when
the court continues to the effect that the deed implied a power con-
veyed to the grantee to make leases of the mineral rights, and that in
making such leases the grantee would be in a "sort of trust relation
to the grantors." Regrettably, the court in a case of first impression,
failed to draw the distinction between ownership of the oil and gas
in place and the mere right to participate in the proceeds of produc-
tion. The Florida Supreme Court, on the other hand, in Neel v.
Rudman 5 takes judicial cognizance of the difference between a
conveyance of royalty and the grant of minerals in place, and the
standard form of instruments, then in use in Florida by which such
interests are created.
A 1955 Kentucky decision seems to adopt the Oklahoma view
that reference to royalty is ambiguous as to whether the parties
mean royalty in the strict sense of a share in production, or as re-
ferring to a full mineral interest.76 One decision construes the
transfer of a fractional part of all the oil and gas in and underlying
and produced from certain land as a conveyance of a mineral fee
0 ee Summers, Transfers of Oil and Gas Rents and Royalties, 10 Texas L. Rev. 1, 9 et seq. (1931)
and the West Virginia cases there discussed.
"' Harris v. Cobb, 49 W. Va. 360, 38 S.E. 559 (1901) and see also Kilcoyne v. Southern Oil Co.,
61 W. Va. 539, 56 S.E. 888 (1907).
72 Paxtum v. Benedum-Trees Co., 80 W. Va. 187, 94 S.E. 472 (1907).
"a 133 Colo. 208, 293 P.2d 302 (1956).
4 251 Ala. 349, 351, 37 So. 2d 635, 637 (1948).
1 '160 Fla. 36, 33 So. 2d 234 (1948).
7" Kavanaugh v. Clay, 275 S.W.2d 938 (1955), involving a deed conveying "the following de-
scribed oil and gas royalties and interest in oil and gas . . . one undivided 1/64 oil and gas royalty."
The court, noting the absence of an oil and gas lease, designated the instrument "ambiguous," and
affirmed a lower court decision which, partly on the basis of parol evidence, construed the interest
as 1/64 mineral fee, which was the entire interest of the grantor.
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estate,7 and another case resolves an inconsistency between the
granting and "intention" clauses of a mineral deed in favor of the
latter.78
MISCELLANEOUS JURISDICTIONS
ILLINOIS, OHIO & PENNSYLVANIA
Several decisions indicate adoption of the principle of qualified
ownership of oil and gas in Illinois, although a mineral grant con-
stitutes a conveyance of an interest in the land and creates a
freehold estate.79 A federal court decision in Illinois, however, seems
to adopt the minority West Virginia rule in holding that a reser-
vation of 3/4 of the oil, gas and other petroleum royalties under
an existing or any future leases reserved fee simple title to the oil
and gas rather than a mere royalty right. 80 On the other hand, a
reservation of 1/16 of all oil and minerals produced for fifteen
years was held to create a term royalty interest in Hardy v. Great-
house,8' the court drawing a distinction between perpetual and term
interests. A clause in a deed reciting an intention to vest of the
mineral ownership in the grantee has been held controlling over a
granting clause conveying only 1/2 of 1/8 of the oil and gas.
Although its decisions are somewhat in conflict, Ohio, like
Illinois and California, is now apparently numbered among the
"non-ownership" states. Unlike most jurisdictions adopting this
view, however, Ohio is reluctant to admit that title to the minerals
may be separated from the surface estate, denoting an attempted
severance as conveying only a license.8 4 One decision implies dis-
approval of the West Virginia rule that the reservation of royalty
is tantamount to an exception of the corpus of the minerals. 85
Although there is a dearth of Pennsylvania authority, this
state seems to acquiesce in the minority rule that conveyances of
perpetual royalty interests create ownership in the corpus of the
minerals in place."6
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the mass authority concerned with the mineral-royalty
question, it is difficult to arrive at definite conclusions. Except in
77 Gillespie v. Blanton, 214 Ky. 49, 282 S.W. 1061 (1926).
7
8
Stanley v. Slone, 216 Ky. 114, 287 S.W. 360 (1916).
7
9
Miller v. Ridgley, 2 III. 2d 223, 117 N.E.2d 759 (1954) (reservation of "all oil rights"); Triger
v. Carter Oil Co., 372 III. 182, 23 N.E.2d 55 (1937); Notford Oil and Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 III. 9,
84 N.E. 53 (1908). But cf. Vandenbark v. Busiek, note 80, infra, where the court speaks of an interest
in oil and gas in place.
-0 Vandenbark v. Busiek, 126 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1942), the court indicating that "the reservation of
a perpetual interest in the royalty has the effect of reserving the thing for which the royalty is paid."
The fact that the reservation expressly provided that the grantor should receive 3/4 of all "bonuses,
rents . . . and other benefits" as well as royalties could explain the decision.
•s 406 III. 365, 94 N.E.2d 134 (1950).
'Smith v. Grubb, 402 Ill. 451, 84 N.E.2d 421 (1949).
'Back v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 113 N.E.2d 865 (1953); but cf. Pure Oil Co. v. Kindall, 116 Ohio St.
188, 156 N.E. 119 (1927).
64 Back v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., supra note 83.
bs Pure Oil Co. v. Kindall, supra note 83.
I Mandle v. Gharing, 256 Pa. St. 121, 100 AtI. 535 (1917); Weakland v. Cunningham, 3 Sad.(Pa.)
519, 7 Ati. 148 (1886), reservation of V2 the "profits" of all minerals held to be a reservation of the
corpus of such minerals in place.
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Kansas, where the Rule Against Perpetuities is a factor, it should
be possible for the draftsman in any jurisdiction to create a perpet-
ual interest in production which does not participate in bonuses,
rentals or leasing privileges, regardless of the legal appellation
which may be affixed to such an estate. It is elementary, however,
that extreme care must be utilized if such a result is to be achieved.
The danger of relying solely on the word "royalty" is illustrated by
many of the decisions.
The title examiner faces a more perplexing question. He must
take the title as he finds it and if the chain includes a history of
mineral conveyancing, the chances of entanglement predominate.
Not only must the examiner be fully aware of the local decisions,
he must also attempt to predict the judicial reaction to untested
language. Even a casual perusal of the many cases discloses that
the possible variations in phraseology are almost limitless. The
solution does not lie in the use of printed forms presently in exis-
tence. The author has examined some twenty-three printed forms
of mineral and royalty conveyances in general circulation. 87 More
than half were mislabeled or contained provisions inviting liti-
gation. The Kansas and Texas decisions demonstrate the pitfalls
attendant to reliance on forms, as well as the problems arising from
ineptness in their use. In light of the uncertainty surrounding con-
veyances and reservations of mineral and royalty interests, the
examiner would be well advised to require curative documents in
doubtful cases.
mThe author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Mr. A. W. Mitchem, Chairman of the
Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association's Legal Sub-Committee on Printed Forms, in making these
documents available.
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MARKETABLE TITLE - WHAT CERTIFIED COPIES OF
COURT PAPERS SHOULD APPEAR OF
RECORD - AN ADDENDUM
By ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT
Royal C. Rubright received his B.A., LL. B., and LL. M. degrees from the
University of Colorado. He has served as an Instructor of Law at the Uni-
versity of Denver, as Lecturer at the University of Colorado and has con-
tributed several previous articles on real property law to DICTA and the
Rocky Mountain Law Review. Mr. Rubright is President of the Denver Bar
Association and a member of the Colorado and American Bar As-
sociations. He is a partner in the Denver firm of Fairfield and Woods.
The original article in the January-February 1957 issue of
DICTA' attempted to set down the consensus of most lawyers about
recording practice. Some able lawyers-and a judge-have men-
tioned certain points which should be clarified.
Division VII 3(a), referring to discharge of an executor and
vesting title in a testamentary trustee, stated that the court must
make a finding that the testator intended the court should not retain
jurisdiction of the trust. That statement is too strong. The statute
actually states: "If... it shall appear to the county court that it was
not the intention of the testator that the court should continue the
administration of the estate . . ."I
Assume that the will contains a statement something like the
following: "I intend that the trust shall be administered free from
jurisdiction and control of the court in which my estate is admini-
stered, and that the court shall not continue administration of my
estate after final settlement thereof but shall order the trust fund
to be turned over, conveyed and delivered to my trustee as such."
It thus appears to the county court that the testator intended
to free the testamentary trustee from court supervision. Under the
practice in Denver, the court, on final settlement, will approve a
receipt signed by the testamentary trustee and will then discharge
the executor.
If no equivalent language is contained in the will, the court
will not permit the executor to take the final receipt from the trustee
until the trustee has qualified by taking the oath as such and giving
bond to the court. In this case, letters of testamentary trusteeship
are issued.
In the light of this typical procedure it is better practice for the
order of discharge of the executor to contain a finding-which the
attorney should prepare himself-that the testator intended to free
the testamentary trust from court control. The presence or absence
of such a finding is not, however, indispensable and if inspection of
the estate file shows no oath, bond nor letters, then paragraph 3 (a)
I Rubright, Marketable Title-What Certified Copies of Court Papers Should Appear of Record,
34 DICTA 7 (1957).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1 152-14-11 (1953) (emphasis added).
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of the article applies. The finding would obviate a trip to the court
to inspect the file.
Two additional comments are necessary with respect to Division
I of the original article. The reference to the year 1958 with respect
to recording should refer to recording of the old receipt for inheri-
tance tax which contained a description of property. Recording of
the release of inheritance tax lien has been required by the express
terms of the statute since 1943.1
In addition to the steps for protecting a purchaser against a
federal estate tax lien mentioned on page eight of the original
article, the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section
6324, afford protection to a bona fide purchaser of real property
from the estate. If the proceeds of sale are used to pay charges
against the estate and expenses of administration, the federal estate
tax lien is divested from the property sold. Estates which are large
enough to be subject to federal estate tax nearly always involve a
will which gives the executor power of sale without court order.
Normally, no court orders are obtained. However, in order to secure
the protection of the federal statute, an order confirming sale pur-
suant to statute4 could be obtained and not recorded, finding the
necessity for the sale and requiring that the proceeds shall be used to
pay such charges and expenses.
8
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 138-4-61 (1953).
'Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 152-13-25 (1953).
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Constitutional Law-Due Process-Service by Publication
Insufficient for Condemnation of Local Resident's Property
By ROBERT L. VER SCHURE
Robert L. Ver Schure received his A.B. degree from Calvin College. He is a
student at the University of Denver College of Law.
Plaintiff, a Kansas resident, sued to enjoin the City of Hutchin-
son from taking his land following condemnation proceedings. The
complaint questioned the sufficiency of a statute' which allowed
notice of such proceedings to be given by publication in the official
city newspaper. Although the plaintiff was a resident of the munici-
pality, and his name was on the official city records, he never re-
ceived actual notice of the action until after the time for appeal had
expired. The Court declared the city's action unconstitutional, and
held that where a landowner is a resident of a state and his name is
known to the city and on its official records, mere newspaper pub-
lication of proceedings to condemn his property lacks the quality
of the notice required under the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 77 Sup. Ct. 200 (1956).
The Walker case is not the first in which the Supreme Court has
considered the quality of notice sufficient to meet the requirements
of due process. In the 1888 case of Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry.,2 a sub-
stantially identical predecessor of the same Kansas statute' was
questioned by a plaintiff who was a non-resident and whose land
was correctly described in the published notice. The Court held that
under those circumstances the publication was sufficient to meet
the requirements of due process.
A 1924 case, North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman,4 involved
condemnation proceedings by the United States. Notice of the pro-
ceedings had been published in a city newspaper in compliance with
a Wyoming statute. 5 The landowner had actual notice of the pro-
ceedings before the time for appeal had expired, but instead of
appealing, he brought an action to enjoin the land company from
taking his property. In deciding that the statute met the require-
ments of due process, the Court said that although property may not
be taken without reasonable notice to the landowner, a statute does
not contravene the fourteenth amendment unless the property
owner is denied the fundamental right to be heard.
United States v. Winn,' a 1949 case, questioned a similar statute T
which allowed notice by publication of condemnation proceedings.
The statute permitted such notice if the landowners were unknown,
minors, or non-residents, and in cases where the owner refused for
any reason to convey. Although the land in question was properly
IKan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 26-202 (1949), provided that the commissioners were to give a land-
owner, "ten days notice in writing of the time and place when and where the damage will be
assessed, or by one publication in the official city newspaper . . ." This statute was amended in
1955 subsequent to filing of the Walker case, to require that after publication, the notice must be
mailed to the landowner unless his residence is unknown and cannot be ascertained. Id. § 26-202
(Supp. 1935).
'130 U.S. 559 (1888).
Kan. Camp. Laws art. 9, § 86 (1879).
4 268 U.S. 276 (1924).
'Wyo. Camp. Stat. Ann. § 2525 (1910).
S83 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.S.C. 1949).
'S.C. Code Ann. § 2046 (1942).
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described, the landowner's name was not mentioned in the notice,
since no deed could be found conveying the land to him. It was held
that because the proceedings were in rem to acquire land for public
use, the statutory notice by publication was sufficient to meet the
requirements of due process.
Without a closer examination of the above mentioned cases
there would seem to be a direct conflict between them and the
Walker case. However, upon comparing their respective facts, it will
be observed that they can be reconciled. In the Huling case the land-
owner was not a resident of the state in which his property was
located. In such circumstances the practice of giving notice by pub-
lication is universally recognizedA The Court pointed out that the
statute allowing publication of notice rests upon the presumption
that since the landowner is outside the state and cannot be served
personally, a published notice, designed to attract the attention of
all, takes the place of personal service. A landowner should not be
allowed to escape the obligations which accompany the ownership
of property merely because he resides outside the state in which his
property lies. The "non-resident" situation found in Huling was ob-
viously lacking in Walker where the landowner resided in the mu-
nicipality.
The Winn case is readily distinguished from Walker in that the
landowner in the former was unknown to the public officials. Fur-
thermore, the plaintiff in the Winn case actually had seen the pub-
lished notice. Obviously, in Winn the only practical means of giving
noti6e was by publication, whereas in Walker the plaintiff was
known to the city through its official records.
In North Laramie Land Co. the landowner received actual no-
tice, but chose not to follow the normal procedure to protect his
interest. This situation did not exist in the Walker case where the
landowner had no actual notice of the proceedings until after the
appeal time had expired.
In deciding the Walker case the Court based its conclusion upon
Mullane v. Hanover Bank and Trust Co.9 There the defendant had
management of a common trust fund and petitioned for a settlement
to be binding on everyone having an interest in the common fund.
The -only notice of the settlement proceedings was by publication in
a local newspaper. The Court said that published notice to unknown
or non-resident beneficiaries would be allowed since it is the only
practical method of notification, but held that before depriving a
known person of substantial property rights personal notice must be
given. It should be observed that the facts in the Mullane case were
quite unlike those in Walker, in that the former dealt with settle-
ment of a trust fund. Trust actions are regarded by some courts as
actions in personam. 10 In any event, they lack the true in rem
character of condemnation proceedings.
.See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); Via v. State Commission, 9 F. Supp. 556 (D.C. 1935); Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 50-1-2 & 4 (1953)(allows publication only when the landowner is a non-resident or an
unknown, or for any reason ccnnot or will not consent to the taking of his property); Colo. R. Civ.
P. 4(g)(2)(i)(provides for publication when the landowner is unknown or a non-resident); Gwinner
v. Gary Connecting Rys.. 182 Ind. 553, 103 N.E. 794 (1914).
. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
10 Id. at 312; Freeman, Judgments §§ 1517-22 (5th ed. 1925).
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The practice of giving indirect notice in property actions is well
recognized. The authority to establish procedure for such notice
has been left to the state legislatures." This was emphasized by Mr.
Justice Burton's dissenting opinion in Walker where he stated that
such a notice provision is within the discretion of a state's law mak-
ing body.- He argued that to deny this state power or to declare its
exercise unconstitutional would be to fail to allow adequate scope
to local legislation.
In deciding the Walker case, the Court emphasized the impos-
sibility of setting up a rigid formula as to the type of published
notice that must be given. Plainly, the Court did not declare uncon-
stitutional all state statutes which allow notice by publication, nor
did they declare the Kansas statute generally unconstitutional.
Rather the Court pointed out that under certain circumstances in-
direct notification will not be allowed regardless of the character of
the action. Apparently the decision was based solely on the peculiar
facts and circumstances presented. Had the landowner received
actual notice and come into court only for the purpose of questioning
the sufficiency of the statute, the Court might well have decided that
he had no ground to complain.
u See note 8 supra.1 Wiqht v. Davidson, 181 U.S. 371 (1901); In re New York, 99 N.Y. 569, 2 N.E. 642 (1885).
77 Sup. Ct. at 208 (1956)(dissenting opinion).
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Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment Due Process-
Involuntary Blood Taking as Judged by a Socio-Legal Court
By DWIGHT D. MURPHEY
A former student at Colorado University and the New York University
Graduate School of Business Administration, Mr. Murphey is a student at
the University of Denver College of Law and Note Editor of DICTA.
After an automobile accident, a state highway patrolman di-
rected a physician to take blood from the arm of the unconscious
driver for use in an alcoholic content test. The smell of alcohol on
the driver's breath and an almost empty liquor bottle found in the
car had indicated that the driver had been drinking. The result of
the blood analysis was used to secure his conviction for involun-
tary manslaughter in a New Mexico court. No appeal was taken.
A subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, by a 6-3 decision,
affirmed on the grounds (1) that the right against admission of
illegally obtained evidence under the fourth and fifth amendments
to the United States Constitution is not enforceable against the
states as a generative principle of the Bill of Rights, and (2) that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was not violat-
ed inasmuch as the taking of blood without the petitioner's consent
was not conduct sufficiently offensive or brutal as to deprive him
of fundamental constitutional guarantees. In two dissenting opin-
ions, it was objected that such an act was shocking to the conscience
and hence unlawful. Breithaupt v. Abram, 77 Sup. Ct. 408, 412, 413
(1957).
The first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution have
never been held to be restrictions upon the states.' Nor has it been
held that the specific enumeration of a right among the Bill of
Rights is alone sufficient to make that guarantee applicable against
the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.2 Rather, this clause encompasses only those rights which, re-
gardless of whether they are explicitly mentioned in the Bill of
Rights, are found through a long history of judicial inclusion and
exclusion" to be fundamental to a free society.
4
Among the restrictions thus excluded from the meaning of the
due process clause is the fifth amendment guarantee against com-
pulsory self-incrimination in a criminal proceeding.5 In federal
prosecutions illegally obtained evidence is inadmissable under the
interpretations given the fourth and fifth amendments.6 The states,
however, are free to act as they choose in this regard, and the ad-
missibility of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure
is a matter to be determined in each state by its own law.'
If, on the one hand, a state forbids admission of illegally ob-
tained evidence, its use violates the state's law and hence might be
I Barron v. Baltimore, 10 U. S. (7 Pet.) 464 (1833).
'Polka v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884).
3 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 104 (1877).
4 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312 (1926); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
$Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) (leading case); Adamson v. California, 332 U. S.
46 (1947); Polka v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
6 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).7
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 38, Appendix, Table 1 (1949).
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considered a violation of due process. Thus the Wisconsin Supreme
Court recently held that the taking of blood for an alcoholic con-
tent test while a person was unconscious after an accident, and the
subsequent use of the test results against him in a trial for negli-
gent homicide, was, in this manner, unconstitutional both under the
state constitution8 and the fourteenth amendment due process
clause.0
A state may, on the other hand, follow one of two other pos-
sible policies. It may, like Colorado, 10 permit the admission of such
evidence under its law," or it may mix its policy by only partially
allowing the use of illegally obtained evidence. 2 In a state where
the first course prevails, and sometimes in a state of the second
type, the defendant in a criminal proceeding has no recourse to the
Federal Constitution to secure the exclusion of this sort of evidence
unless it can be shown that some part of the state's action has run
counter to one or more of the fundamental rights brought under
the due process clause by judicial interpretation. 13
The New Mexico court has interpreted that state's constitution-
al provisions as allowing the admission of illegally obtained evi-
dence."4 The United States Supreme Court in the Breithaupt case
15 (1911).
followed the well-established rules just mentioned in holding that
under these circumstances no error was present in the use of the
evidence.
However, it is also established that any prejudicial act by gov-
ernment which is of such a nature as to shock the community's
sense of fairness is outside due process of law,' and whether such
an act had been perpetrated was the primary issue in the Breit-
haupt case. Personal sensibilities are not the criteria for this test
unless they are generally shared by the population. In the Court's
opinion, due process is an evolutionary concept changing as the
people's practices and thinking change."' In each case, however, the
SWis. Const. art. 1, § 8 (1870).
Wisconsin v. Kroenig, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N. W.2d 810 (1956).
'°Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 Pac. 1019 (1925).
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 35, Appendix, Table E (1949).
" See, e. g., Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954).
1Ibid. See note 3 supra.
14 State v. Dillon, 34 N. M. 366, 281 Pac. 474 (1929), construing N. M. Const. art. 2, § § 7, 10,
13 Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
i"[D]ue process is not measured by the yardstick of personal reaction or the sphygmogram of
the most sensitive person, but by the whole community sense of 'decency and fairness' that has
been woven by common experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct." 77 Sup. Ct. at 410.
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private right involved must be weighed against the interest of gov-
ernment in performing its functions."
This point of view is to be distinguished from earlier positions
taken by the Court. Although the due process clause has long been
taken to include a largely undefined body of basic rights,18 the
establishment of a sociological test for inclusion and exclusion is
philosophically opposed to those conceptions of the law which hold
that law is to be immutable except as it is changed by legislative
action and that rights are to be secure against shifts in majority
opinion. Breithaupt represents the "modern" trend. The "tradition-
al" view was perhaps best expressed by the late Justice Sutherland
when he cautioned that although the law is inclusive of all new
situations to which it applies, it must not be taken to mean some-
thing which it did not mean when written.19 The "modern" position
considers the major premises of the law as evolutionary. 20 The "tra-
ditional" legal philosophy holds that only the factual situations,
the minor premises, may evolve without the action of the properly
constituted legislative organs. Whether this conflict involves a dif-
ference of opinion as to the outcome of the Breithaupt case under
the two conceptions of the law is, of course, speculative. It is quite
possible to reach the same conclusion through different lines of
reasoning.
The Court in the principal case, however, relied upon the dis-
covery of criteria by induction, which is-under the Court's present
doctrine-the only avenue of approach open. It is significant that
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, placed much
emphasis upon the extent of blood sampling in the United States
both in general medical practice and under the laws requiring blood
tests prior to marriage.2 ' The Court also appeared to stress the de-
gree of the subject's physical exertion in opposing the violation of
his body as a test of considerable importance,2' probably with the
view that this is relevant to the manner by which the general com-
munity would react to bloodtaking. In a prior case in which the
man had struggled violently to avoid stomach-pumping, the Court
held that the public conscience had been offended.23 On the other
factual extreme, a California case held that no offensive act oc-
curred where blood was taken from a driver's arm while he was
unconscious after an automobile accident.24 However, in the last
1777 Sup. Ct. at 412.
uTwining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 176 (1899).
Is "[T]he meaning of the Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic
events. We frequently are told in more general words that the Constitution must be construed in
the light of the present. If by that it is meant that the Constitution is made up of living words that
apply to every new condition which they include, the statement is quite true. But to say, if that be
intended, that the words of the Constitution mean today what they did not mean when written-that
is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which they would have applied then-is to rob that
instrument of the essential element which continues it in force as the people have made it until they,
and not their official agents, have made it otherwise. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U. 5. 379, 402 (1937) (dissent).
20See, e. g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U. S.'483 (1954).
21"The blood test procedure has become routine in our everyday life. It is a ritual for those
going into the military service as well as those applying for marriage licenses. Many colleges require
such tests before permitting entrance." 77 Sup. Ct. at 410.
2 "[T]he absence of conscious consent, without more, does not necessarily render the taking
a violation of a constitutional right." 77 Sup. Ct. at 410 (emphasis supplied). See also the interpreta-
tion of the Court's opinion given in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren, who said: "The
Court's opinion suggests that an invasion is 'brutal' or 'offensive' only if the police use force to
overcome a suspect's resistance." Id. at 413.
mRochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
"People v. Haeussler, 41 Col. 2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953).
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mentioned case, the blood sample was also needed for typing in
order that the injured driver might receive a transfusion. The Breit-
haupt case lay between these two cases in terms of the violence
done, and in none of the blood-taking cases mentioned here was a
struggle present. It will be interesting to see what the Court will
decide if ever a case arises pertaining to a state's right to use evi-
dence obtained by a hypodermic withdrawal of blood from a con-
scious and strongly resisting defendant.
An additional constitutional issue involved in these cases seems
now to be settled. The statutory provision that a high blood alcohol
content is to be taken as presumptive of intoxication has been up-
held against the contention that it established an unconstitutional
presumption of guilt.2 5 Unquestionably, the alcoholic content of
blood has a strong, rational connection with the fact of intoxication.
Several criticisms of Breithaupt might be offered. Primarily it
must be recognized that the view, discussed above, that the con-
tent of liberties is to shift with the changing feelings of the people
is, in itself, inconsistent with the Rule of Law, and therefore incon-
sistent with perhaps the most fundamental concept of a free society.
Each man's protection against the misuse of power should not de-
pend upon the vicissitudes of his neighbors' opinions. If there is to
be an evolution of the law it is better that the rights of the people
should always be broadly construed and the powers of government
narrowly confined. The "public interest" to enforce a particular law
should never be held to outweigh the interest which the people have
at stake in the protection of private rights if substantial methods of
law enforcement exist in the alternative. The states are not so des-
titute of means to enforce traffic laws that they must puncture the
unwilling bodies of their citizens. In the instant case, for example,
other evidence was present, including a near-empty liquor bottle
and the smell of alcohol on the driver's breath. The state may well
have been able to obtain testimony by persons who had witnessed
his drinking. It can hardly be said that there is a paucity of alter-
native proofs in cases involving overt acts which may be seen by
others and which often give rise to abundant circumstantial
evidence.
25 State v. Childress, 78 Ariz. 1,274 P.2d 333 (1954).
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Income Taxation-Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses-
Meals and Lodging Furnished Hotel Managing Partner
Not Deductible.
By ANNE DOUTHIT
Anne Douthit is a student at the University of Denver College of Law and
a Registered Accountant. She received her B.S. in Business Administration
from the University of Denver in 1951. She is immediate past president of
the Denver Chapter of the American Society of Women Accountants.
The taxpayer was a general partner with a forty-nine percent
interest in a Denver hotel. The partnership agreement required
that he live at the hotel in order to properly perform his duties as
manager and executive head of the hotel's operations. His wife
and daughter also lived at the hotel, and took their meals there
for the convenience and benefit of the partnership, rather than for
their own personal convenience. Amounts representing costs of
meals and lodging so furnished were not eliminated from the
operating costs and expenses which were deducted from income
on the partnership income tax return filed by the taxpayer and
his partner. Nor were these amounts shown as income to the
taxpayer on his individual return. When the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue assessed deficiencies on the taxpayer's return
for amounts representing the cost of meals and lodging furnished
to him and his family, he paid the deficiencies and sued for a
refund in the Colorado federal district court. The district court
held that these amounts did not constitute income to the taxpayer,
nor was it necessary for him to eliminate the amounts from de-
ductible expenses of the partnership. The Commissioner appealed
and by a per curiam decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the partnership could not include these amounts in its
deductible expenses. United States v. Briggs, 238 F.2d 53 (10th
Cir. 1956.)
The question presented by this case, that of whether or not
the cost of meals and lodging received by a hotel owner-operator
is deductible as an "ordinary and necessary business expense" on
the federal income tax return of such owner-operator, has been
creating considerable controversy among various courts and internal
revenue officials in the past few years. The question first was
decided in 1951 by the Tax Court in a case with an identical fact
situation. In George A. Papineau' the Tax Court held that the costs
of the managing partner's meals and lodging do not constitute
income to him, and are properly operating expenses of the hotel.
A few years later three more cases with similar fact situations
came before the Tax Court. The Tax Court decisions in these cases
followed Papineau.2 Two of these later decisions were reversed
' 16 T.C. 130 (1951).
2 Everett Dock, 24 T.C. 569 (1955); rev'd, 234 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1956)(leading case); Richard E.
Moran, 14 T.C.M. 813 f1955), rev'd, 236 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1956); Leo B. Wolfe, 14 T.C.M. 791 (1955).
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when appealed by the Commissioner 3 to the Fourth and Eighth Cir-
cuits respectively. The Tenth Circuit's reversal of the Briggs case
was on authority of these two decisions.
The internal revenue code provides that all ordinary and neces-
sary expenses incurred or paid during the taxable year in carry-
ing on a trade or business shall be allowed as a deduction. This
section specifically includes reasonable allowances for salaries or
other compensation for personal services, and also, traveling ex-
penses for meals and lodging while away from home.4 There is
further provision in the code that no deduction shall be allowed
for personal, living or family expenses.' The 1954 Code in a new
provision, section 119, allows an employee whose meals and lodg-
ing are furnished purely for the convenience of the employer, and
required to be taken on the premises as a condition of employment,
to exclude the value of such meals and lodging from his gross
income.6 It should also be noted in connection with the instant
case, that the code does not consider a partnership as a separate
taxable entity, but holds the individual partners liable for their
income tax only in their separate capacities.7
Relating these provisions of the code to the problem at hand
brings up several questions. Obviously where a resident manager
is an employee, hired with the condition that he live in the hotel,
the cost of his maintenance is an operating cost, the same as his
salary. Now under section 119 of the 1954 code these amounts do
not constitute taxable income to him.8 Although there was no pro-
vision in the 1939 code to this effect, there was such an exclusion
in the regulations.9
But can an owner-operator or resident manager who is a
partner in the business consider his living expenses in the same
category as those of an employee? The court of appeals decisions
would indicate that he cannot. In support of its views, the Fourth
Circuit stated that the nature of such expenditures cannot be
altered by the fact that there is an indirect contribution to the
business. The personal characteristics remain. A deduction could
only be justified if the expenses were in excess of what normal
personal and living expenses would be.10
The views of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in this
situation have been expressed clearly in a revenue ruling which
followed the non-acquiescence in the Papineau case. This ruling
states that costs attributable to personal and living accommoda-
tions of a hotel owner-operator should be eliminated from the
deductible costs and expenses in computing the income of the
business, and the resulting increase in income must be included
in the managing partner's share of the net profits.1 '
The Tax Court's reasoning in determining that amounts repre-
3 Commissioner v. Moran .236 F.2d 595 (Sth Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. Doak, 234 F.2d 569 (4th
Cir. 1956).
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a)(1)(A), as amended, 66 Stat. 442 (1
9
52)(now Int. Rev. Code of1954, § 162).
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 24 (a)(1), as amended, 56 Stat. 819 (1942)(now Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 262).
'tnt. Rev. Code of 1954 A ''9. See also U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22 (o)-3 (1953)
St. Rev. Code of 1939: § 181, 53 Stat. 69 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 701).
sSee note 6 supra.
U.S. Trees. Reg. 118, § 39.22 (a) -3 (1953).
"Commissioner v. Doak, 234 F.2d 569 (4th Cir. 1956).
'1 Rev. Rul. 80, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 62.
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senting the value of meals and lodging furnished a resident manager
who is also an owner do not constitute income directly attributable
to him is sound. In the Papineau case it was reasoned that a sole
proprietor cannot create income for himself by buying himself
meals and providing himself with lodging. It was further pointed
out that one cannot employ or compensate oneself.
However, it appears to this writer, that the very reasons used
to support the fact that an owner-operator cannot create income
for himself through personal expenditures in connection with a
business, conflict with the Tax Court's reasoning in allowing these
expenditures to be deducted in computing net income for the
business. Again in Papineau it was stated that it was not the
intention of the code that expenses of operation be computed,
eliminating small portions of depreciation, cost of food, wages,
and general expenses to represent the cost of meals and lodging.
1 2 If
a partner cannot be an employee for the purpose of receiving income
in the form of meals and lodging, then it should follow that he
cannot be an employee for the purpose of creating operating
expenses to the business in the form of meals and lodging.
The decisions of the Tax Court have stressed the fact that the
owner-operator is living in the hotel, and eating meals there, for
the convenience and benefit of the business, rather than for his
own convenience. But, as long as he is a partner, or a sole owner
of the business, it would seem that anything that is for the con-
venience and benefit of the business is also for his benefit. Any-
thing he does to increase business income increases his own income.
This is not true of the employee who is required to live and board
on the premises of an employer. He is not the direct beneficiary
of this contribution to the business. Furthermore, an employee has
no control over his employment conditions, but must abide by the
requirements of his employer. A partner is a party to a partner-
ship agreement which stipulates where, and how, he is to live in
order to carry out his obligations. The requirements of a partner-
ship agreement are more or less self-imposed requirements, which
cannot be compared with employment contracts. For these reasons,
it is this author's opinion, that the Commissioner is entirely justified
in disallowing the deduction of this type of expenditure, and in
including it in the resident managing partner's proportionate share
of income from the partnership.
See 16 T.C. at 132.
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Mines and Minerals-Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases-
Implied Covenant to Further Explore
By MARILYN CIMINO
Marilyn Cimino is a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
The heirs of Mary Bryson, deceased lessor of certain oil leases,
brought suit against the lessee's assignee, Willingham, to cancel his
lease on the ground that the assignee had breached the implied cove-
nant of further reasonable exploration. In the alternative, the
lessors asked that Willingham be compelled to explore further
under penalty of forfeiture. Of the four wells on the lease, only one
was producing oil and gas in very small, but paying, quantities. Evi-
dence established that new production methods clearly would pro-
duce oil from deeper sands than those reached by the present wells.
The court held: the operator had breached the covenant of further
reasonable exploration when he refused to drill under such circum-
stances as would lead a reasonable, prudent operator to drill ad-
ditional wells with fair expectation of producing oil and gas in pay-
ing quantities.
The implied covenant is nothing new to oil and gas leases.
Apparently the first case to recognize the covenant to develop after
discovering paying oil and gas was Stoddard v. Emery.1 In that 1889
decision the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced by way of
dictum that, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary,
an implied duty arises to develop the property reasonably. Since the
Stoddard case, the doctrine of implied covenants in oil and gas
leases has become well settled.2 By its nature, the oil and gas lease
is incapable of containing provisions for all the circumstances that
may arise during its term, therefore, the usual lease form merely
excludes mention of many situations likely to arise.
Germane to this discussion are only those covenants implied in
the drilling clause of one lease. Merrill has recognized three implied
drilling obligations: (1) to drill an initial well, (2) to drill an
offset well, and (3) to drill additional wells.8 Though the first two
of these doctrines have been generally recognized and followed in
most jurisdictions, a conflict marks the third. The majority rule
divides the covenant to fit two distinct situations. The more obvious
of the two is the duty to develop proven producing territory, and,
not so obvious, but equally important-the duty to explore un-
proven territory. Unproven territory as construed most favorably
to the lessee is that containing one or perhaps more wells producing
in small, but paying, quantities. The necessity for a covenant to
explore becomes paramount after a producing well has been
developed. Then the lessee has lost his right to delay drilling by the
1 128 Pa. 436, 18 At. 339 (1889).
'See 2 Summers, Oil and Gas § 395 (Perm. ed. 1938).
3 Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases 23 (2d ed. 1940).
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payment of rentals, and the only consideration flowing to the
lessor is the payment of royalties.
While jurisdictions surrounding Texas were adhering to the
doctrine of the implied covenant to further explore, Texas held out
strongly in favor of the lessee and clearly repudiated it. The Texas
Court of Civil Appeals recognized in Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil
Co.4 that where the lease fails to define the lessee's duty regarding
development after discovery of paying oil and gas, the law implies
an obligation to continue drilling with reasonable diligence. The
opinion concluded, however, that the alternative decree of cancel-
lation was an improper remedy and that it would override by
judicial interpretation the intent of the parties.
In Spurlock v. Hinton5 the same court found that no such im-
plied equitable doctrine existed, and that the only remedy was an
action for damages. Texas followed these decisions,' utilizing a
variety of reasons without mentioning the implied exploration
covenant.
The United States Supreme Court case of Stauder v. Mid-
continent Petroleum Corp.- did little to sway the Texas courts. In
Stauder the court held the lessor had the duty to prove the lease
had been abandoned, or that an offset well was needed, or that a
reasonably prudent operator under similar circumstances would
have drilled a well. While there was some question of drainage in
the case, the Court based its decision chiefly on the last issue, stating
that it would be inequitable to permit the lessee to hold the un-
developed balance of land for speculation without drilling or
having any intent to drill in the near future. An alternative decree
was granted to the lessor, i.e., to drill within a specified period or
surrender the lease.
Some twenty years after the Stauder decision Texas still had
not recognized the lessee's obligation to drill additional wells after
production in paying quantities. Although in 1954, the Texas Su-
preme Court in Perkins v. Mitchell8 granted relief to the lessor, the
implied obligation of the lessee had little importance in the case.
There the lessor brought suit to cancel an oil and gas lease on the
ground that the lessee had failed to reasonably develop the property.
There was no evidence as to how long the lessee had refrained
from drilling. One expert was allowed to testify to the effect that
he would drill a well if he were in similar circumstances. A con-
ditional decree to drill an additional well or suffer cancellation was
rendered for the first time in Texas. Even though the court talked
in terms of reasonable development, the case actually turned upon
further exploration of deeper, unproven sands.9
In the principal case the primary issue was whether there is
an implied covenant to explore as distinguished from the obligation
to develop after production. By answering this question in the
4 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929).
s225 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
6 Fort Worth Nat'l Bank v. McLean, 245 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Senter v. Shonafelt,
233 5.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). (no proof of profitable production); Guleke v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 126 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Gibson v. Sheldon, 90 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936). (action for damages proper under facts rather than equitable decree of cancellation).
7 292 U.S. 272 (1934).
8 153 Tex. 368, 268 S.W.2d 907 (1954).
. Conflicting answers to specific questions put to the iury were the issues on appeal, but the
court found that the answers could be reconciled and passed lightly over the exploration issue.
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affirmative, the Texas courts had advanced in only two years from
bare recognition' ° to complete approval of the doctrine. Just why
Texas was so tardy in applying the implied covenant to explore has
been the subject of much conjecture. One writer feels that the
willingness to wildcat the Texas fields has, perhaps, minimized
litigation by dissatisfied lessors." At any rate, the lessor may now
have his remedy in Texas.
Colorado has not yet had to pass on a case involiving precisely
the same facts. As early as 1898, however, the Colorado Supreme
Court found an implied covenant that the lessee should exercise
reasonable diligence in working a mineral lease.12 Thirty years
later in Florence Oil & Refining Co. v. Orman" a lease which
granted the lessee exclusive exploration rights was cancelled with-
out notice to the lessee by the lessor. The lessee had drilled four
wells, only one of which produced any oil and gas, and that was not
of a paying quantity. Four years after the lessee had pulled the
casings and quit the premises, a cancellation was granted on the
ground of abandonment. Since no oil and gas had been produced,
no estate had vested in the lessee. The court stated: "He (lessee)
could not be sued on an implied covenant to search, because no
covenant existed.'
14
At first glance this appears to be a direct denial by the Colo-
rado Supreme Court of an implied exploration covenant, but here
there was no prior production. The court indicated when it cited
with approval an Ohio case15 that an implied covenant to develop
arises after the lessee has discovered and produced paying oil and
gas.
From this conclusion regarding development of a leasehold
after production of paying oil and gas, it is but a short step to reach
a similar conclusion where further exploration is in issue. With oil
production and exploration on the increase in Colorado, the exist-
ance of the implied covenant to further explore will surely arise
here as an issue before too long. The influence of Willingham v.
Bryson should be heeded and followed by the Colorado courts.
'10 Perkins v. Mitchell ,153 Tex. 368, 268 S.W.2d 907 (1954).
1Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 553 (1956).
02 Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Pryor, 25 Colo. 540, 57 Poc. 51 (1898).
' 19 Colo. App. 79, 73 Pac. 628 (1903).
14 Id. at 92, Pac. at 632.
's Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502 (1897).
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Negligence-Physicians and Surgeons-Surgeon's Liability
for Negligence of Hospital Employees
By EDWARD S. BARLOCK
Edward S. Barlock received his B.S. in Law from the University of Denver
College of Law in 1957. He is a student in the College of Law and is
Case Comment Editor of Dicta.
Plaintiff suffered serious injuries in a fall from a hospital op-
erating table. After the plaintiff had been placed on the operating
table and rendered unconscious by anesthetic, the defendant surgeon
instructed an orderly employed by the hospital to secure the plain-
tiff to the table by a strap. The orderly left the room to get a strap,
and while the surgeon turned to have his gown tied, the plaintiff
rolled off the table. Held, judgment against the surgeon affirmed.
Under the particular facts in the instant case, it was negligence on
the part of the surgeon to order the attendant to do anything that
might cause him to leave the patient unprotected. In such a situation
neither the concurrent negligence of others nor the fact that the
injury occurred prior to the operation will relieve a surgeon from
liability. Beadles v. Metayka, 311 P. 2d 711 (Colo. 1957).
When the science of surgery was still embryonic, the rule that
a surgeon is not liable for the negligence of hospital employees pre-
vailed.1 Many of the early decisions were based on a finding that the
surgeon did not exercise control over the negligent employee.2 Final-
ly, in Emerson v. Chapman- the Oklahoma court departed from
precedent, holding a surgeon liable for the negligence of a hospital
nurse in preparing a patient for operation under the immediate
supervision and control of the surgeon. At present there is a conflict
in the decisions that have dealt with the question involved in the
Beadles case. A majority of the courts have held that a surgeon is
not liable in this situation.4 Of course these decisions are to be dis-
tinguished from the so-called "sponge" cases in which the negligence
occurs during the actual operation.
The precise question before the court in the Beadles case was
one of first impression in Colorado and the instant decision has es-
tablished an important precedent. Since the instant case has held
that a surgeon is liable for the pre-operative negligence of hospital
employees, it is clear that the Colorado court has extended a sur-
geon's liability beyond the traditional limits set out in the majority
decisions which generally have held a surgeon's liability to be co-
extensive in time with the operation.' Under these cases an opera-
tion is said to begin when the incision is made and to end when the
opening has been properly closed.6
I Broz v. Omaha Moternity and Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 96 Neb. 648, 148 N.W. 575 (1914).
"'E.g., Harris v. Fall, 177 Fed. 79 (7th Cir. 1910).
138 Okla. 270, 280 Pac. 820 (1929).
E.g., Hohenthal v. Smith, 114 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Blackman v. Zelig, 90 Ohio App. 304,
103 N.E.2d 13 (1951); Sacchi . Montgomery, 365 Pa. 377, 75 A.2d 535 (1950); Shull v. Schwartz, 374
Pa. 554, 73 A.2d 402 (1950).
5 Flower Hospital v. Hart, 178 Okla. 447, 62 P.2d 1248 (1936).
6See, e.g., Akridge v. Noble, 114 Go. 949, 41 S.E. 78 (1902).
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In yet another respect the opinion in the Beadles case differs
from other opinions on the problem. The majority of courts, under
similar circumstances, have predicated liability on the basis of
control, applying the doctrine of respondeat superior. For example,
in McCowen v. Sisters of the Most Precious Blood 7 where negligence
on the part of a nurse employed by the hospital resulted in the pa-
tient's falling from an operating table, the court based its holding on
the master servant relationship. In reversing a directed verdict in
favor of the defendant hospital, the court distinguished the prepara-
tion of patients for surgery from the work usually done by a physi-
cian or by a nurse in assisting a surgeon during the actual operation.8
In a recent Pennsylvania case9 the court, after weighing the fac-
tors involved in determining whether or not there existed a master
servant relationship between the defendant surgeon and a nurse
employed by the hospital, held that the question of control should
have been submitted to the jury. The Pennsylvania court reasoned
that if there was liability it arose as a result of the authority and
control exercised by the surgeon. In the Beadles case, on the other
hand, the court placed emphasis upon the particular facts, stating
that the jury was justified in finding that the surgeon had been
negligent. To support its somewhat nebulous position the Colorado
court cited with approval the broad principal enunciated in a lead-
ing Oklahoma case1- where that court concluded that, as a matter of
policy, surgeons should be held liable for the negligence of those
working under them. If surgeons were not held liable, "the law in
a large measure would fail in affording a means of redress for
preventable injuries sustained from surgical operations."'
In the instant case it is manifest that the intricacies of the doc-
trine of respondeat superior and the difficulties presented by the
concurrent negligence of others were inoperative to dissuade the
court from providing a just and efficient remedy for an injury
wrongfully sustained. It was not disputed that someone had been
negligent, and liability for this negligence extended to the surgeon.
'208 Okla. 119, 253 P.2d 830 (1953).
8253 P.2d at 834.
Benedict v. Boni, 384 Pa. 574, 122 A.2d 209 (1956).
"Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pac. 752 (1923).
"1221 Pac. at 755.
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Torts-Federal Tort Claims Act-Government Liable for Negligence
of Federal Forest Service in Fighting Fire
By DONALD E. SPIEGLEMAN
Donald E. Spiegleman is a student at the University of Denver College of
Law.
Petitioners brought an action against the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act,' alleging as the proximate cause of
their property loss the negligence of the federal forest service in
allowing a forest fire to spread and burn the petitioners' land. The
district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and
the court of appeals affirmed.2 The Supreme Court, in vacating the
prior judgments, held that under the tort claims act the United
States would be liable for the negligent acts of the forest service if
the law of the place where the act occurred would impose liability
on a private individual under similar circumstances. Rayonier Inc. v.
United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 374 (1957).
Traditionally, a sovereign, in the absence of its consent, has
been immune from suit.' Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
United States, subject to certain exceptions, is liable for the negli-
gence of its employees "in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances.' 4 The scope and
meaning of this section have confused the courts for more than a
decade. Cases where the government has performed a uniquely
governmental function which has no private counterpart have been
especially difficult. Such a case is Rayonier.
Prior to 1955, the courts generally denied recovery in these
cases, holding that the act contemplates analogous private activity '
and does not create new causes of action where none existed before.2
Thus, in Feres v. United States,7 it was held that a serviceman on
active duty, who was injured by the negligence of others in the
armed forces, could not recover under the act. The Court reasoned
that there could be no analogous private liability because no private
person has power to conscript or mobilize a private army." The
opinion did state that except for the status of the parties the Govern-
ment would have been liable.' Three years later the Dalehite case' °
128 U.S.C. § 1346 (1952). "[T]he district court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims against the United States for money damages . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the low of the place where the act or omission occurred." Id.
§ 1346 (b).
2 Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 225 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1955).
* See, e.g., Kowananakoo v. Polybonk, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
' 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952) (emphasis supplied).
5 E.g., National Mfg. Co. Y. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967
(1954)(recovery denied for injuries due to erroneous weather reports because there was no private
counterpart). However, a few pre-1955 cases allowed recovery, apparently on the ground that the
act was intended to impose liability in this type of case. See, e.g., Somerset Seafood Co. v. United
States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951)(negligence of Government in marking the spot of a sunken
ship); Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948)(plaintiff injured by a military
policeman).
6 E.g., Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ala. 1
9 49
)(suit against Government
for negligence in discharging a mental patient from an army hospital).
7 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
a But cf., Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949)(soldier on furlough hit by an army
truck recovered damages).
9340 U.S. at 142.
10 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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conidered Government liability for the Texas City disaster. Two
boat loads of fertilizer manufactured under the direction and control
of the United States exploded as a result of a fire which started on
one of the ships and spread to the other. Many deaths and a great
loss of property ensued. The Court, relying mainly on the act's "dis-
cretionary function" exception," denied recovery.12 But, regarding
the negligence of the coast guard in fighting fire, the Court followed
the reasoning in Feres stating, "there is no analogous liability; in
fact, if anything is doctrinally sanctioned in the law of torts it is the
immunity of communities and other public bodies for injuries due
to fire fighting."
'1 3
n 28 U.S.C. §. 2680 (a) (1952) provides that the provisions of the act shall not apply to "Any
claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the government, exercising due core, in the
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the government, whether or not the discre-
tion involved be abused." A good case showing the application of this exception is Coates v. United
States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950)(changing course of Missouri River). For a discussion of the
limitations of this exception see Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.);
aff'd per curiam sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1
95 5
)(negligence of airport
tower operator during landing procedure).
n The Dalehite case was the test case representing the claims of others totaling more than
$200,000,000. It should be mentioned that Congress subsequently expressed its disapproval of the
decision by assuming the responsibility of the United States for the losses. 69 Stat. c. 864 (1955).
How? With Automatic Message andnow yOU Answering Service (AMANDA). When
you leave for lunch, for an afternoon
appointment, or go home in the eve-
ning, you turn AMANDA on. Then,
I N when a customer calls, the machine
automatically records his message.
hen you come back to the office, you
know exactly what your customer
wanted: No lost business. No disgusted
you're...
To get complete information,
just call your local telephone
manoger. He'll hurry over
:::" with all the details.
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1955 marked a change in the Court's attitude. In Indian Towing
Co. v. United States,14 the petitioners sought recovery for negligence
of the coast guard in allowing a lighthouse light to become extin-
guished. It was held that the Government's liability does not depend
upon the presence or absence of identical private activity" nor upon
whether a state or municipality would have been immune had it
been engaged in the function. Liability depends, rather, on whether
a private individual engaged in the same activity would be liable
under the substantive law of the place where the act occurred.
Moreover the Court rejected a contention frequently raised by the
Government in other cases-that the United States should be treated
as a state or municipality within the "governmental-proprietary"
distinction.-6 The Court did not expressly overrule Feres or Dalehite,
but rather distinguished them on their facts. It is notable that in the
instant case the lower court based its decision entirely upon the
reasoning in Dalehite, but the Supreme Court took the position that
Dalehite had been overruled by Indian Towing.
The Rayonier case represents an application and extension of
the test set forth in Indian Towing. It may appear to be a radical
departure; for traditionally a sovereign, in the absence of a statute
to the contrary, has been relieved of liability for injuries resulting
from the maintenance and operation of its fire departments."
Obviously the Court did not intend this new rule to apply to sover-
eigns generally, but only to the United States.
The principal case represents a liberal construction of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, giving the act the effect intended by Con-
gress. 8 It is a policy decision based upon the rationale that it is
better to spread the loss among all the taxpayers than to place the
entire burden upon the person wronged. In this sense the decision
constitutes a true growth in the law governing federal tort claims.
Nor is its significance merely doctrinal. Its practical effect may be
felt by lumbermen, farmers, and ranchers throughout the country
since the federal forest service controls and protects vast forest
acreage, including more than seven million acres in Colorado.
I8 S., note 10 supra at 44.
14 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
13 "[W]e would be attributing bizarre motives to Congress to hold that it was predicating
liability on such a completely fortuitous circumstance-the presence or absence of identical private
activity." Id. at 67. See also United States v. Louter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955)(plaintiff's wife
fell out of a helicopter during rescue operations).




7 See Annots., 9 A.L.R. 143 (1920), 33 A.L.R. 688 (1924), 84 A.L.R. 514 (1933).
18O'Toole v. United States, 206 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1953)(plaintiff's automobile collided with an
army tractor) (dictum).
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The last sentence beginning on page 220 of the July-August 1957 issue
(34 DICTA 220) was inserted through a printer's error and should not have
been included in the article. Apologies to the author, Mr. Harold S. Bloom-
enthal.
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